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TERMINATING COLLEGE HEAD COACHES’ EMPLOYMENT WITH
CAUSE FOR NCAA RULES INFRACTIONS
JOSH LENS, J.D.*
ABSTRACT
College athletics and its finances are in flux due to several recent incidents. Many athletics departments claimed to lose millions of dollars due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. The NCAA v. Alston Supreme Court decision
will result in universities and athletics departments providing their student-athletes with additional education-related benefits. Due to the
NCAA’s rule change permitting student-athletes to monetize their names,
images, and likenesses, companies will likely divert sponsorship resources
from athletics departments and toward student-athletes directly.
Thus, it is increasingly important for athletics departments to be prudent with resources. One area where university athletics departments have
historically wasted millions of dollars is head coach severance payments.
Some have paid head coaches millions of dollars in severance upon terminating their employment. More specifically, universities, through their
employment contracts with head coaches, put themselves in a no-win situation when they must make an employment decision regarding a head
coach if the NCAA accuses that coach of committing a significant NCAA
rules violation. Under the current standard head coach contract, universities often have two options. A university may terminate the coach’s employment without cause and pay the coach a large severance payment.
Alternatively, if the university wants to terminate the coach’s employment
with cause and avoid the severance payment, it must continue to employ
and pay the coach while awaiting adjudication of the violation allegation,
which can take years and result in litigation.
This Article examines this no-win scenario for universities by first exploring a head coach’s job responsibilities and the relevant employment
contract provisions under which they perform them. Next, the Article
analyzes instances where prominent head coaches violated NCAA rules
and how their employment contracts shaped their universities’ handling
of the resulting employment decisions. Finally, the Article proposes contract language that would provide universities flexibility and potential cost
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of Arkansas, Fayetteville (J.D., University of Iowa College of Law). Prior to
entering academia, Lens worked on Baylor University’s athletics compliance staff
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athletics conferences and university athletics departments regarding legal and
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coach contracts. The views this Article expresses are the author’s and not
necessarily representative of the University of Arkansas or Baylor University.
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savings when faced with an employment decision for a rule-breaking head
coach.
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INTRODUCTION

I

N 2017, the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) Committee on Infractions (COI) concluded that then-University of Louisville
(Louisville) head men’s basketball coach Rick Pitino committed an NCAA
violation by failing to properly supervise a staff member.1 In violation of
NCAA rules (and common sense and morals), the Louisville staff member
arranged for strippers and prostitutes for prospective or current studentathletes, some of whom were minors.2 As a result, the COI placed Louisville on probation for four years, fined it thousands of dollars, and suspended Pitino from coaching in five conference games.3 This was not
Pitino’s first scandal. In 2003, he had an affair with and impregnated a
woman who extorted money from Pitino for her abortion.4
Louisville retained the legendary Pitino despite the fact that his actions, or lack of, with respect to the strippers and prostitutes scandal likely
violated his employment contract with the University.5 Not only did Louisville continue to employ Pitino, but it also did so at a salary that was the
highest in college basketball.6 It was not until Pitino’s association with a
third very public scandal that Louisville initiated employment termination
proceedings with Pitino.7 It took this third strike, where federal authorities tied Pitino’s program to a 2017 scheme in which prospective studentathletes received compensation to attend and play for certain universities,
1. See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS DECISION 2 (June 15, 2017), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102682 [https://perma.cc/LHF3-6N6L] [hereinafter LOUISVILLE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION].
2. See id. at 1 (“The COI has not previously encountered a case like this.”).
3. See id. at 22–24. Louisville also had to vacate 123 men’s basketball victories
and return its portion of conference revenue sharing; see also Michael McCann,
Rick Pitino’s Contract Dispute and its Potential Impact on Larger NCAA Scandal, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 14, 2017), http://si.com/college/2017/10/14/rick-pitino-louisville-contract-dispute-ncaa-scandal-fbi-investigation [https://perma.cc/R7BYL2AP] (describing Pitino’s dispute with Louisville regarding the amount the University owed him after it terminated his employment).
4. See Cari Grieb, Louisville’s Response to Rick Pitino’s Sex-Related Controversies
Warned of Troubled Moral System, SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), http://sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-basketball/news/louisville-basketball-rick-pitino-controversies-sex-scandal-fbi-investigation-flawed-system/e9w7cpgpbg981ahzx96nibwel
[https://perma.cc/L3DT-NRHT] (arguing that Louisville could have terminated
Pitino’s employment after either of the first two scandals and thus avoided involvement with the third).
5. See id. (pointing out that Louisville could have invoked a morals clause in
Pitino’s employment contract to terminate his employment).
6. See Sam Belden, Rick Pitino Will Reportedly Lose Out on Up to $55 Million, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2017), http://businessinsider.com/rick-pitino-effectively-firedsalary-contract-louisville-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/XGK4-XSQC] (noting Pitino
made nearly $8 million in the 2017-18 season and Louisville owed him $38 million
through 2026 under his employment contract, with another $17 million “set to
come from bonuses and other earnings”).
7. See Grieb, supra note 4.
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for Louisville to terminate Pitino’s employment “for cause.”8 Terminating
Pitino’s contract for cause relieved the University of the $44 million it contractually owed him.9 Pitino, however, quickly rebounded; within a year
he was the head men’s basketball coach at Iona University.10
The 2017 federal investigation into bribes and corruption in men’s
college basketball implicated Pitino’s program along with numerous other
programs. It led to the arrests of ten men. Of the ten arrested, seven pled
guilty and three were convicted.11 Prosecutors accused six assistant men’s
college basketball coaches of accepting bribes, and all either resigned or
had their employment terminated.12 Of the head coaches of the numerous men’s basketball programs that federal authorities implicated in the
scandal, most were able to “continue[ ] to work and earn millions of dollars in compensation.”13 The following serve as examples of embroiled
head coaches who kept their jobs, at least for a time, despite involvement
in the scandal:
• Chief among them is then-Louisiana State University (LSU)
head men’s basketball coach, Will Wade. According to NCAA
allegations, Wade violated NCAA rules by paying eleven prospective student-athletes to attend LSU.14 HBO aired an audio recording in 2020 of Wade infamously disclosing that he
made a “strong ass” offer to procure a high-profile prospective student-athlete.15 After media reports about the contents
of that call, LSU suspended Wade in 2019.16 The suspension
8. See McCann, supra note 3 (“From a plain reading of Pitino’s contract, it
appears that the University is well within its authority to fire him for just cause.”).
9. Tyler Conway, Rick Pitino’s Louisville Contract Officially Terminated with ‘Just
Cause,’ BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 16, 2017), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
2739014-rick-pitinos-louisville-contract-officially-terminated-with-just-cause [https:/
/perma.cc/8RST-T5VU].
10. See Mark Schlabach, Your Guide to College Basketball’s Ongoing NCAA Investigations, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2020), http://espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/
id/30262819/your-guide-college-basketball-ongoing-ncaa-investigations [https://
perma.cc/2Z5C-QE33].
11. See id. Federal authorities did not arrest Pitino.
12. See id. (noting that federal authorities accused the six assistant coaches of
“accepting bribes to steer [student-athletes] to certain financial advisors and
managers”).
13. Id. (querying why the NCAA infractions process is moving so slowly).
14. See id. (explaining the NCAA enforcement staff said it received information that Wade “arranged for, offered and/or provided impermissible payments,
including cash payments, to at least 11 men’s basketball prospective student-athletes, their family members, individuals associated with the prospects and/or nonscholastic coaches in exchange for the prospects’ enrollment at LSU” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the HBO documentary included audio of a call between Wade and agent Christian Dawkins in which Wade
discussed the offer to sign coveted prospective student-athlete Javonte Smart).
16. See id. (quoting Dawkins from the documentary as stating, “I think the
only way you can interpret someone in a head-coaching position saying that they
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was short-lived, however. Wade missed just one game, and
LSU and Wade continued to enjoy on-court success despite
working under a “cloud of suspicion” as the NCAA enforcement process runs its course.17 When LSU finally received
the formal notice charging Wade with NCAA rules violations
in 2022, the University terminated his employment with
cause.18
• Sean Miller remained the head men’s basketball coach at the
University of Arizona (Arizona) for the 2019–20 and 2020–21
seasons even after prosecutors played a damning wiretap recording during a federal criminal trial.19 In the wiretap, former Arizona assistant coach Book Richardson told agent
Christian Dawkins that Miller paid “then-Wildcats star Deandre Ayton $10,000 per month.”20 There was also evidence of
academic fraud and provision of other benefits to student-athletes that would violate NCAA rules.21 Regardless, Arizona officials publicly supported Miller while he coached for two
more seasons until terminating his employment five weeks after the 2021 season concluded.22 Despite the allegations
against Miller and his program, and the fact that his team had
not won an NCAA tournament game since 2017, Arizona
owed Miller $1.4 million under his employment contract
made a strong-ass offer, they ain’t talking about a scholarship offer, bro . . . . One
hundred percent talking about money”).
17. Scott Rabalais, Change is Coming for LSU Basketball. How Much Change is the
Key Question, ADVOCATE (Mar. 23, 2021, 7:19 PM), http://theadvocate.com/baton_
rouge/sports/lsu/article_18e80798-8c2c-11eb-bb49-a727ce164c09.html [https://
perma.cc/JUM2-V6H6] (noting Wade has led LSU to three postseason appearances in his four seasons).
18. See Amie Just & Wilson Alexander, LSU Has Fired Will Wade for Cause After
Allegations of Major NCAA Violations. Here’s Why, ADVOCATE (Mar. 12, 2022), http://
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_c8a96cb0-8e01-11e9-ad1e47d4f9c2baf6.html [https://perma.cc/FR2Z-28QV].
19. Miller won over 300 games during his tenure at Arizona, which includes
seven NCAA tournament and two Elite Eight appearances. See Adam Zagoria,
NCAA Coaching Carousel: Sean Miller is Out at Arizona. Where Will the Wildcats Go
Next?, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2021, 2:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
adamzagoria/2021/04/07/ncaa-coaching-carousel-sean-miller-is-out-at-arizonawhere-will-they-go-next/ [https://perma.cc/TVQ4-85R6].
20. See Schlabach, supra note 10 (noting Miller denied paying Ayton, who was
the first overall selection in the 2018 NBA draft).
21. See id. (describing issues relating to transcripts of then-prospective student-athletes).
22. See Gary Parrish, Arizona Fires Sean Miller, but It Would Have Made More Sense
For Everybody if This Had Been Done Much Sooner, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 7, 2021), http://
cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/arizona-fires-sean-miller-but-it-would-havemade-more-sense-for-everybody-if-this-had-been-done-much-sooner/ [https://
perma.cc/5H44-MVUA] (noting that influential boosters continued to support
Miller despite his troubles, making it difficult for administrators to terminate his
employment).
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upon terminating his employment.23 The University stated at
the time of Miller’s employment termination that it would
honor Miller’s contract and pay him accordingly.24
• In the aftermath of the federal investigation of men’s college
basketball, the NCAA leveled five Level I violation allegations
(the most severe categorization) against the University of Kansas (Kansas) men’s basketball program, including one against
longtime head coach Bill Self.25 The NCAA’s case centered
on a former Adidas employee paying prospective student-athletes to attend Kansas.26 The case placed both Kansas and
Self at risk of severe sanctions, potentially including multiple
years of postseason bans and a yearlong suspension of Self
from coaching.27 Despite the allegations and potential penalties, Kansas stood by Self.28 In fact, during the midst of the
NCAA infractions process, Kansas effectively awarded Self a
23. See Zagoria, supra note 19 (describing Miller’s Arizona tenure as “long and
winding”).
24. See Anne Ryman & Jeremy Cluff, Arizona Basketball Fires Coach Sean Miller
After 12 Seasons: ‘We Need to Move Forward’, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 7, 2021), http://
azcentral.com/story/sports/college/ua/2021/04/07/arizona-basketball-firescoach-sean-miller-according-report/7124947002/ [https://perma.cc/AP4CNBQJ].
25. See Pat Forde, Bill Self’s Lifetime Contract Makes Clear Where Kansas’s Priorities
Lie, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 2, 2021), http://si.com/college/2021/04/02/billself-lifetime-contract-kansas-ncaa-investigation [https://perma.cc/Q9WJ-MAQ3]
(describing the NCAA’s lack of institutional control and head coach responsibilities allegations against Kansas and Self, respectively). At the time of this publication, Self’s resume includes coaching Kansas “to a national championship, 15 Big
12 Conference titles, and 17 NCAA tournament appearances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Kansas and Self vehemently dispute the allegations, and Self
is contemplating legal action against the NCAA. See Mark Schlabach, Kansas Basketball Coach Bill Self Considering Legal Action vs. NCAA, Attorney Says, ESPN (Jun. 18,
2020), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/29329604/
kansas-basketball-coach-bill-self-considering-legal-action-vs-ncaa-attorney-says
[https://perma.cc/W3RR-5Z75] (quoting Self’s attorney’s letter to the NCAA as
threatening “negligence, breach of contract, defamation, fraud, tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective contract” claims (internal quotation marks omitted)). In fact, Kansas has paid two law firms over $1
million to defend itself. See Sam Zeff & Greg Echlin, KU Has Paid Huge Legal Bills
Defending Alleged Violations in Men’s Basketball Program, KCUR (Nov. 25, 2020),
http://kcur.org/sports/2020-11-24/ku-has-paid-huge-legal-bills-defending-allegedviolations-in-mens-basketball-program [https://perma.cc/3B5U-S27V].
26. See Forde, supra note 25 (characterizing Kansas’s defenses to the NCAA’s
allegations as “laughable”).
27. See id. (describing range of penalties that the NCAA’s penalties matrix
contemplates).
28. See Jesse Newell, NCAA Goes Hard at Bill Self. But His Lawyers Say It’s ‘Only
KAN. CITY STAR (May 7, 2020), https://
Reinforced (His) Resolve,’
www.kansascity.com/sports/college/big-12/university-of-kansas/article
242585046.html [permalink unavailable] (quoting Self’s attorneys as stating that
Kansas’s chancellor and athletics director at the time supported Self’s quest to
defeat the “meritless and irresponsible allegations”).
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lifetime employment contract paying him over $5 million annually.29 So not only did Kansas retain Self in the face of severe NCAA allegations, it “rewarded” him “with extended job
security.”30
The situations involving these head coaches are examples of a scenario that universities and athletics departments frequently face—having to
make employment decisions regarding head coaches who face allegations
that they violated NCAA rules. Those unfamiliar with college athletics and
coach contracts may be surprised (and perhaps disappointed) to learn
that the decisions are often complicated. Because of their employment
contracts with head coaches, universities and athletics departments increasingly spend significant amounts of money on severance payments to
head coaches. For example, just fifteen years ago, two-thirds of “Power 5”
conference member universities did not encounter severance payments to
a football coach.31 In the 2020 fiscal year, however, nearly two-thirds of
those same universities provided severance payments to a former head
football coach.32 It is not just the number of universities and athletics
departments that pay severance that is staggering; the amounts are also
astounding. Public universities in Power 5 conferences paid a combined
$66 million in severance payments in the 2020 fiscal year, for an average of
$1.2 million per university.33 During Harvey Perlman’s tenure as the University of Nebraska’s chancellor from 2001 to 2016, the University terminated four head football coaches’ employment.34 The resulting severances
29. See Forde, supra note 25 (describing the contract as “impressively
brazen”).
30. Id. (stating “it’s good to be Bill Self”).
31. Andy Wittry, Power 5 Spending on Coaches, Support Staff Increased by Average of
$1.7M Per School in the 2020 Fiscal Year, OUT OF BOUNDS WITH ANDY WITTRY (Jun. 10,
2021), http://andywittry.substack.com/p/power-5-spending-on-coaches-support
[https://perma.cc/Q5HE-5RE8] (analyzing data from NCAA Membership Financial Reporting System). College athletics constituents describe the Big Ten, Big
12, Atlantic Coast, Pacific 12, and Southeastern conferences as the Power 5 conferences. These five conferences are college athletics’ biggest and wealthiest and thus
the NCAA permits them to enact legislation that only applies to them. See John
Wolohan, What Does Autonomy for the “Power 5” Mean for the NCAA? LAW IN SPORT
(Feb. 11, 2015), http://lawinsport.com/topics/item/what-does-autonomy-for-thepower-5-mean-for-the-ncaa [https://perma.cc/GZX7-D7XF] (citing Syracuse University and Duke University as examples of Power 5 universities).
32. See Wolohan, supra note 31 (noting that the number of universities that
provided severance payments to head men’s basketball coaches decreased in 2020,
likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic ending the season early).
33. See id. (noting the amount decreased from the 2019 fiscal year, likely due
to the COVID-19 pandemic).
34. See Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, FBS Schools Spent Over $533.6 Million
in Dead Money Over 10+ Years, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2021), http://espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/32552130/schools-spent-5336-million-dead-money [https://
perma.cc/4A3J-4TYN] (listing the terminated football coaches as Frank Solich, Bill
Callhan, Bo Pelini, and Mike Riley).
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payouts were “just the cost of doing business.”35 Because of their employment contracts with head coaches, some universities have paid a substantial amount of severance to a head coach implicated in a significant NCAA
rules violation. For example, as this Article analyzes in Section II.B.1., Arizona paid Miller $1.5 million in severance despite allegations of numerous
significant NCAA rules violations in his men’s basketball program.36
This Article examines the scenario in which universities face employment decisions regarding head coaches who violate NCAA rules. A university’s most realistic options often are to: (1) continue to employ the coach
because of the coach’s success or because it is cost prohibitive to terminate
the coach’s employment without cause; or (2) attempt to terminate the
coach with cause and likely encounter litigation. Part I of the Article examines the college head coaching profession, with a focus on how and why
universities get themselves into the precarious position in the first place.
More specifically, Part I explores typical head coach employment contract
provisions, including clauses that require head coaches to follow NCAA
rules and make their failure to do so justification for employment termination for cause. Part II details examples of these situations and takeaways
from them. It also suggests contract language that would provide universities flexibility and help them save millions of dollars when they face employment decisions regarding coaches implicated in NCAA rules
violations. The Article ends with a brief conclusion.
I. THE COLLEGE HEAD COACH PROFESSION

AND

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Over the past few decades, “college [athletics] transitioned from a
time-honored tradition . . . to an economic commodity.”37 Generating
billions of dollars annually for its constituents, college athletics has become big business in the United States.38 For example, in 2005, The Ohio
35. See id.
36. See Erick Smith, Arizona Parts Ways with Sean Miller After 12 Seasons as Men’s
Basketball Coach, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2021, 5:11 PM), http://usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaab/pac12/2021/04/07/sean-miller-out-after-12-seasons-arizonas-mensbasketball-coach/7124927002/ [https://perma.cc/DMF3-FESJ] (noting Miller’s
employment contract with Arizona did not place responsibility on him to offset the
$1.5 million payment through future employment).
37. Heidi Roche, Loyalty v. Laissez Faire: The Coaching Contract Conundrum and
Antitrust Implications of a No-Tampering Policy in College Sports, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 219, 221 (2013) (describing college athletics as previously “respected for its
rivalries and cherished for its pure, inspiring nature”).
38. See Martin J. Greenberg & Jay S. Smith, A Study of Division I Assistant Football and Mens’ Basketball Coaches’ Contracts, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 25 (2007);
see also Kevin Stangel, Protecting Universities’ Economic Interests: Holding Student-Athletes
and Coaches Accountable for Willful Violations of NCAA Rules, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
137, 137 (2000) (“The role of intercollegiate athletics at major colleges and universities has undergone a dramatic change since the inception of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) in 1906.”).
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State University (OSU) reported $89.7 million in athletics revenue.39 In
2020, that amount nearly tripled to $233 million.40
Further, college athletics programs are important in higher education, as many view a university’s athletics department as its metaphorical
“front door.”41 Good coaches are the heart of a successful athletics program, and universities obsess with hiring the best.42 A head coach can
generate not only wins, but also revenue for a university.43 This Part describes a college head coach’s job duties and the typical employment contract under which the coach performs them.
A.

The College Head Coaching Profession

Serving as a college head coach can be a “24-7” job.44 In modern
college athletics, college head coaches’ roles and importance are akin to
CEOs’ in other industries.45 The standard employment contract between
a head coach and their university bears this out by “broadly” describing
the head coach’s duties.46 These responsibilities extend beyond conducting practices and coaching in games.47 Today’s head coaches’ duties
include recruiting prospective student-athletes, fundraising, coordinating
their student-athletes’ academics, serving as public figures and media per39. See Andy Wittry, College Athletics Spending and the Movement Towards Revenue
Sharing, ATHLETIC DIR. U., https://www.athleticdirectoru.com/articles/studentathlete-revenue-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/6U3Q-TB35] (last visited Feb. 8,
2022) (examining NCAA Membership Financial Reporting System annual
reports).
40. See id.
41. Richard T. Karcher, Redress for a No-Win Situation: Using Liquidated Damages
in Comparable Coaches’ Contracts to Assess a School’s Economic Damage from the Loss of a
Successful Coach, 64 S.C. L. REV. 429, 433 (2012).
42. See Greenberg & Smith, supra note 38, at 26 (describing coaches as “vital
to the success of the athletics program”). One legal scholar points to head
coaches’ impact on recruiting and signing talented prospective student-athletes as
the key to winning. See Karcher, supra note 41, at 431 (explaining that “universities
view head coaches as the principal ingredient to . . . a successful athletic
program”).
43. See Stephen F. Ross & Lindsay A. Berkstresser, Using Contract Law to Tackle
the Coaching Carousel, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 709, 728 (2013) (describing successful head
coaches as “valuable commodities”).
44. Martin J. Greenberg, College Coaching Contracts Revisited: A Practical Perspective, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 127, 127 (2001).
45. Martin J. Greenberg & Steven D. Gruber, You Get Hired to Get Fired, 24
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 141, 146 (2013) (explaining that the modern college head
coach is much more than purely an athletics instructor); see also Brendan L. Smith,
Benched Coaches Shooting Back, A.B.A. J. MAG. (Oct. 1, 2010), https://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/benched_coaches_shooting_back [https:/
/perma.cc/JL4U-JJXW]. (quoting sports law attorney Robert Lattinville).
46. Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 146 (noting that a university’s president or athletics director may also dictate a head coach’s duties).
47. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 127 (citing “exponential growth in . . . responsibilities beyond conducting practices” and coaching in games).
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sonalities, and performing administrative tasks such as budgeting.48 Head
coaches’ jobs can be stressful and constituents may analyze and debate
their every move and choice.49 Ever-increasing media coverage of college
football has intensified this scrutiny.50
Head coaches are among the highest profile employees at their universities.51 Relatively high pay accompanies this profile; and head
coaches’ pay often exceeds that of their universities’ chancellors or presidents, as well as the most esteemed professors.52 As of March 2021, thirtyone head men’s basketball coaches earned more than $3 million annually.53 This has increased from twenty-nine in 2020, twenty-one in 2019,
and fourteen in 2018.54
However, head coaches’ workplace environment lends itself to job insecurity.55 For head coaches, job security once depended on serving as
both a sport instructor and role model for athletes.56 Currently, however,
university administrators judge head coaches on their win-loss records.57
48. See id. at 130–31 (noting that some head coaches experience health
problems due to the position’s demands).
49. See id. at 127. Head coaches receive most of the credit and criticism for
the success and lack of success, respectively, for their athletics programs. See
Greenberg & Smith, supra note 38, at 26.
50. See Randall S. Thomas & R. Lawrence Van Horn, College Football Coaches’
Pay and Contracts: Are They Overpaid and Unfairly Treated?, 91 IND. L.J. 189, 230–31
(2016).
51. See id.
52. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 127 (noting that head coaches’ athletics
accomplishments receive more notoriety than their universities’ science departments’ most celebrated lab discoveries). Head coaches can earn as much as seventeen times the average salary of a full-time university professor. See id. at 137. For a
discussion on the appropriateness of college football head coaches’ pay, see Randall S. Thomas & Lawrence R. Van Horn, Are College Presidents Like Football Coaches?
Evidence from Their Employment Contracts, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 956 (2016) (pointing
out that head football coaches are highly skilled and owe “great responsibility for
their programs and universities” and arguing that, “given competitive labor markets . . . their level of compensation is efficient”).
53. See NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2021), http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach/ [permalink unavailable].
54. See Brent Schrotenboer, Steve Berkowitz & Matt Wynn, Cheating Allegations, Corruption Scandal Don’t Slow Men’s Basketball Coaches’ Pay, USA TODAY (Mar.
11, 2020, 3:27 PM), http://usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2020/03/11/college-basketball-coaches-salaries-schools-pay-more-after-fbi-probe/5012939002/
[https://perma.cc/VMM5-W3ZE]. In 1997, there were only two college coaches
who earned at least $1 million annually. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 137.
55. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 230–31.
56. Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 146 (describing a head coach’s job
security “as fleeting as the last seconds of an overtime victory”).
57. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 941 (explaining that head football “coaches cannot rely solely on [their] close connections to boosters[ ] or trustees” to maintain employment if their teams fail to meet high expectations). Thus,
because winning and revenue often go together, universities assess their athletics
personnel and bottom line similarly to any profit-driven corporation. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 147 (explaining why universities routinely fire
head coaches “at a drastically increased frequency”).
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Winning increases attendance and donations, helps increase the likelihood of lucrative media rights contracts, and influences prospective student-athletes to attend a university.58 Thus, universities often view their
athletics departments not only as a potential revenue source, but as a way
to increase name recognition and application rates.59 Head coaches establish a “brand” for the university.60 Consequently, successful head
coaches can “provide unparalleled value to their . . . universities[.]”61
Men’s basketball and football are often a university’s most visible
sports programs, so their head coaches often create the most value.62 Universities can receive significant revenue when they play in a bowl game or
in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.63 On many campuses, football revenue alone funds most, if not all, of the universities’ other athletics
programs.64 Success on the football field has also benefited many universities’ reputations and provided them national prominence.65 Likewise,
men’s basketball postseason success provides universities free advertising
and results in increased interest among prospective students.66
The potential to garner enormous revenue through athletic success
can present universities and head coaches with a “win at any cost” atti58. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 127 (describing a head coach’s job security
as conditioned on winning because wins are the equivalent of the bottom line).
Winning helps athletic programs sustain success because prospective student-athletes seek to join successful sport programs and maintain that success. See Karcher,
supra note 41, at 431.
59. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 147 (explaining that college
athletics’ “financial stakes are at an all-time high”).
60. See Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 721. This is likely because head
coaches are the face of their athletics programs. See Greenberg & Smith, supra
note 38, at 26.
61. Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 721. The athletics departments that
produce the most revenue “continuously . . . push the envelope on football and
[men’s] basketball coaches’ compensation for the prospect of having successful
programs[.]” Richard T. Karcher, The Coaching Carousel in Big-Time Intercollegiate
Athletics: Economic Implications and Legal Consideration, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2009) (citing the University of Alabama, the University of
Florida, the University of Kansas, Louisiana State University, and the University of
Notre Dame as examples).
62. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 131 (noting that football and basketball
revenue often underwrites women’s sports programs and less visible sports).
63. See id. at 142–44 (“There is no better way to illustrate the high financial
stakes associated with winning than by looking at the dollars paid out for bowl
game participation.”).
64. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 199 (describing the indirect benefits to universities from having successful football programs).
65. See id. (citing the University of Alabama, the University of Notre Dame,
and the University of Florida as examples of universities who enjoy “instant name
recognition at least in part because of their tradition of football traditions”).
66. See Eamonn Brennan, Study: Hoops Success Helps Enrollment, ESPN (Aug. 27,
2012), http://espn.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/63340/studyhoops-success-begets-more-students [https://perma.cc/5G42-LPY8] (citing
George Mason University and Butler University as examples of universities whose
success in the men’s basketball championship led to benefits off the court).
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tude.67 While a successful coach can readily improve a university’s image,
an unsuccessful program can be a detriment.68 Because success is “directly attributable” to a head coach, whose achievements have a substantial
financial impact on a university, a coach’s job tenure should mirror their
capacity to create value.69 It is pricey for a university to retain a head
coach whose program performs poorly.70 If a coach’s program fails to
generate enough revenue or the coach falls out of favor with constituents,
the university may terminate the coach’s employment for financial reasons.71 Thus, even established head coaches whose programs suffers an
unexceptional season or two may lose their job.72
Similarly, many fans’ commitment and loyalty rests with the head
coach, rendering it problematic for the university to recreate its brand and
preserve loyalty when the coach departs.73 A decline in the fan base can
result in lower game attendance and decreased merchandise sales.74 Because athletics programs can serve as revenue generators for many universities, a successful head coach is an priceless resource.75 The next Section
explores how head coach employment contracts reflect this value.
B.

College Head Coach Employment Contracts

While they enjoy large salaries and prestige, college head coaches are
just employees, and employment law governs their employment relation67. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 146 (explaining that revenue potential from
“television, gate receipts, sponsorship relationships, alumni donations and [postseason] tournament participation has put the bottom line or balance sheet psychology on an equal basis with ‘wins and losses’ ”).
68. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 904 (explaining that head
coaches significantly impact their programs’ win-loss records, and winning can
lead to increased revenue).
69. Id. at 904 (comparing head football coaches and university presidents’
roles).
70. Id.
71. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 141–42 (quoting a former Jacksonville University head men’s basketball coach as stating, “[W]inning is the bottom line.
Schools are looking for coaches who run clean programs, graduate their players
and win big. If you stumble in any area, you’re in trouble. But winning big is the
big factor. And that translates into money.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 193 (stating that universities terminate head coaches “promptly” when they perform poorly).
72. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 941.
73. Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 721 (examining appropriateness of
damages when head coaches breach employment contracts).
74. See id. Former Big 12 Conference commissioner Dan Beebe has explained
that university presidents and chancellors walk “a difficult line” in that they “depend on the revenue of certain sports,” which in turn depends largely on having
successful head coaches. Karcher, supra note 61, at 11 (internal quotation marks
omitted). If a successful head coach leaves a university, its revenue may decrease,
or it may signal a lack of commitment to the program, which could cause a decrease in “donations, ticket sales[,] and television appearances[.]” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting this affects “other [sports] programs”).
75. Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 721.
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ship with their universities.76 At common law, employment is at-will, such
that the employer or employee may terminate the employment relationship at any time for any purpose.77 Most United States workers are at-will
employees and thus do not enter employment contracts with their
employers.78
However, an employer and employee may enter a contract modifying
their at-will relationship.79 When an employee is under an employment
contract, the employer typically forfeits the ability to terminate the employee’s employment for any reason at any time without consequence.80
College athletics is a business, and the relationship between the university
and head coach is business-like.81 With many universities and athletics
departments emphasizing on-field success, college coaching is a volatile
industry where, according to some, universities hire coaches to fire
them.82 Given this volatility and the relatively rapid turnover, head
coaches negotiate employment contracts with their universities that include protection mechanisms like multi-year fixed terms and substantial
severance payments in the event of employment termination.83 Universi76. See Martin J. Greenberg & Djenane Paul, Coaches’ Contracts: Terminating a
Coach Without Cause and the Obligation to Mitigate Damages, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
339, 363 (2013) (examining application of damages mitigation principles to injury
or breach of contract situations involving college head coaches); see also Michael S.
Selvaggi, The College v. The Coach, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 221, 225 (1993).
77. See Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 717.
78. See At-Will Employment, NCSL (Apr. 8, 2008), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx [https://
perma.cc/G2UX-SPWU].
79. Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 717 (explaining that the parties may
include “additional protections” against discharging an at will employee, “such as
requiring just cause for firing”). Only those in “important” positions usually enter
employment contracts. See At-Will Employment, supra note 78.
80. See Karen Gwinn Clay, Jury Slam-Dunks JSU for Coach’s Termination, 20 No.
10 MISS. EMP. L. LETTER 7 (Jan. 2014) (describing Jackson State University’s termination of now-former head women’s basketball coach Denise Taylor and subsequent legal proceedings).
81. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 258 (advocating that head coaches and
universities treat their relationship “in the strictest contractual and legal sense”).
82. See Christian Dennie, There Are No Handshake Deals in College Coaching Contracts, 20 NO. 1 ANDREWS ENT. INDUS. LITIG. REP. 2 (2008) (pointing out that head
coaches’ job security depends on the success of eighteen-to-twenty-two-year-old student-athletes carrying out complex strategy and game planning, which would be a
clear path to failure in most professions); see also Greenberg & Gruber, supra note
45, at 141 (explaining that in the college coaching world, job security is a misnomer and describing turnover in college coaching as “an endemic problem”). Due
to the rise of college athletics as big business, college coaching is a high stakes
game “where money talks.” See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 134.
83. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 940–41 (describing likelihood
of a university terminating a head coach at some point in the coach’s career as
“likely”); see also Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 195. Coaches’ useful work
lives are often short for their universities. See Martin J. Greenberg, Termination of
College Coaching Contracts: When Does Adequate Cause to Terminate Exist and Who Determines its Existence?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 197, 254 (2006) (summarizing high
turnover in the coaching profession).
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ties likewise value continuity in their coaching positions and stability in
their athletics programs, and are thus willingly employ their head coaches
for several years.84 In fact, most college head coach employment contracts
contemplate an employment period of at least five years.85 Most head
coaches are not at-will employees, instead contracting to perform duties
exclusively for their universities for several years in consideration of a
steep guaranteed salary.86 Thus, head coaches’ employment is unique
compared to most employees in the workforce in that they are not fungible and thus not easily replaceable.87 Each individual head coach possesses a unique coaching style, personality, and reputations.88
Universities justify their large financial commitments to head coaches
as investments that should pay off through increased ticket sales, marketing and sponsorship revenue, donations, and admissions applications.89
For example, when the University of Alabama (“Alabama”) hired Nick
Saban as its head football coach, then-Alabama President Robert Witt described Saban’s employment contract to the board of trustees as “a sound
84. See Karcher, supra note 41, at 432 (examining reasons why head coaches
are unique employees).
85. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 940–41 (describing the contract length as necessary because head coaches attempt to sway high school-aged
prospective student-athletes to attend their universities, and these prospects and
their families appreciate a strong likelihood that the head coach will be at the
university throughout the prospects’ athletic career at the university). “[D]ue to
the nature of the [college athletics] recruiting process . . . it is neither practical
nor feasible” for head coaches to serve as at-will employees. Karcher, supra note
41, at 432.
86. Karcher, supra note 61, at 3. Head coach salaries continue to rise due
largely to increases in universities’ revenue from bowl game appearances and television contracts, agents successfully representing coaches, and increased competition for successful head coaches. See id. at 6. One legal scholar identifies supply
and demand as the “real impetus for the rise in coaching salaries,” as universities’
“desire to win and . . . perception among college administrators that only a small
handful of coaches in the marketplace” are winners results in “limited supply and
high demand[.]” Id. at 38.
87. Karcher, supra note 41, at 431 (explaining that head coaches are unique
because of their high profile status and daily local and national media coverage of
them); see also Robin Mistretta-Bradley, The Buyout Clause: What’s the Point?, 6
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 141 (2009).
88. See Mistretta-Bradley, supra note 87, at 141 (explaining universities want to
hire and preserve these unique reputations and styles by retaining head coaches).
89. Karcher, supra note 61, at 27 (providing as an example a quote from former University of Florida president Bernie Machen describing then-head football
coach Urban Meyer’s multimillion dollar salary as an investment). Then-University of California athletics director Sandy Barbour once explained, “[I]f we let [a
coach] go because we’re not willing to pay market, we’ll pay a huge price.” Roche,
supra note 37, at 220 (second alteration in original) (quoting Steve Wieberg, Jodi
Upton, A.J. Perez & Steve Berkowitz, Pay Booms in Hard Times, USA TODAY, http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20091110/1acoachpay10_cv.art.htm
[https://perma.cc/JTT4-JKHD] (last visited Nov. 4, 2013)) (describing the “conundrum” that universities face of “pay[ing] the ever-increasing market price” to
hire and retain head coaches, or “lose the chance of obtaining the notoriety, fivestar recruits, and accomplishments that a high-profile coach yields”).
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business decision.”90 Likewise, when the University of Kentucky (“Kentucky”) announced its eight-year, $31.65 million contract with head men’s
basketball coach John Calipari, athletics director Mitch Barnhart explained, “If done correctly, the investment in a coach will pay for itself and
yield returns for the overall program in general.”91
1.

Head Coach Employment Contract Negotiations

Due largely to the fact that successful head coaches enjoy “tremendous leverage,” the head coach negotiation and hiring process is fraught
with peril for universities.92 Universities and athletics directors “scramble”
to fill vacancies during the short period of time in which they clamor to
hire the few desirable head coaches on the market during hiring season in
each sport.93 Once a university identifies a desirable prospective head
coach who has mutual interest, the two parties often enter a memorandum of understanding (MOU).94 The MOU identifies essential items like
the head coach’s salary, length of the employment term, termination benefits, and the buyout clause.95
Once the coach agrees to the job offer, their agent completes employment contract negotiations with the university.96 Once simple and
straightforward, college head coach employment contracts have become
intricate and complex.97 Their primary purposes include specifying the
nature and duration of employment, as well as compensation.98 However,
as universities’ expectations of head coaches increase, both parties may
90. Karcher, supra note 61, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Adam Jones & Cecil Hurt, Saban’s Contract a Done Deal, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (June 15,
2007), http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20070615/NEWS/706150345/
1007/APS [https://perma.cc/W5D8-M929]).
91. Id. at 29 (quoting Steve Wieberg, Brand: ‘Hard Questions’ Need to Be Asked
About Rising Salaries, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
college/mensbasketball/ 2009-04-02-brand-salaries_N.htm [https://perma.cc/
S9SP-C3NQ]).
92. Id. at 39.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 40–41.
95. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 207.
96. See id. at 209 (describing the agent’s role as protecting the head coach
from unfair termination and overly demanding expectations).
97. See Gina A. Pauline & John T. Wolohan, An Examination of the Non-Recruit
Clause in Intercollegiate Coaching Contracts, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 219, 219, 221
(2012); see also Greenberg, supra note 44, at 127 (referring to college coach employment contracts as “sophisticated endeavors” and noting that no standard
forms exist and coaches lack a union that protects their interests). In fact, one
author explains that college coaching contracts evolved from handshake agreements to the modern-day Magna Carta of contracts. See Dennie, supra note 82
(explaining the length and complexity is due to provisions regarding compensation, termination, duration and renewal, and supplemental income).
98. See Selvaggi, supra note 76, at 225 (exploring similarities and differences
between head coach employment contracts and other workers’ employment
contracts).
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intensify efforts to protect themselves in the event of litigation.99 Contract
negotiations may last as long as six months.100
Despite the prolonged long-form contract negotiations, the initial
“panic” to hire a top choice with mutual interest can cause a university to
overpay and engage in subpar negotiations, leaving it exposed.101 Because universities are aware of the potential benefits of athletics success,
head coaches enjoy substantial negotiating power.102 The resulting employment contracts “garner public attention and scrutiny.”103
Due to the nature of the coaching business, regardless of how well the
employment contract is drafted, it is likely that either the university or
head coach will breach the contract one day.104 In fact, some legal scholars believe that employment contracts have minimal meaning to universities and their coaches.105 Some coaches feel the same. For example,
former Marquette University head men’s basketball coach Kevin O’Neill

99. See Pauline & Wolohan, supra note 97, at 219.
100. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 209 (noting that the length of
negotiations depends on the “urgency of the issues and the parties’ positions”). A
college head coach’s employment contract may be as lengthy as eighty pages. See
Greenberg, supra note 44, at 149.
101. Karcher, supra note 61, at 40 (quoting Raymond D. Cotton, an attorney
who specializes in university presidents’ compensation, and who described the process as both “ludicrous” and “not appropriate for higher education” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Greenberg, supra note 44, at 150–51 (explaining
that universities often negotiate head coach employment contracts in a “frenzy” to
lock in big-name head coaches (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edward Stoner II & Arlie Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract (“MCC”): A
Better Starting Point for Your Next Negotiation, 16 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 43, 44 (1989))).
Note that, conversely, first-time head coaches may be so elated to get their first
head coaching position that they fail to hire counsel to review their employment
contracts, leaving them exposed. See id. at 150.
102. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 211 (explaining likelihood of
other universities inviting successful coaches to apply for openings at their universities). Further, universities generally seek to do what they can to ensure their
head coaches enjoy success at the beginning of their tenures. See id. at 209. Head
coaches coming off a successful season enjoy even more negotiating leverage. See
Karcher, supra note 61, at 12–13; see also Ross & Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 728
(referring to “successful . . . coaches” as “valuable commodities” who possess “great
bargaining power over universities”).
103. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 189 (comparing scrutiny to that
of corporate CEOs’ employment contracts).
104. See Pauline & Wolohan, supra note 97, at 221; see also Greenberg, supra
note 44, at 128 (stating that in the college coaching industry, contracts are “not. . .
contract[s],” “job security” is “fleeting,” and that the parties breach employment
contracts easily).
105. Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 143 (explaining that “universities
quickly fire coaches for numerous reasons” and, similarly, “coaches quickly leave
for numerous reasons”); see also Roche, supra note 37, at 221 (describing coaches
and universities’ lack of loyalty and citing coaches’ willingness to breach their employment contracts to attain higher-salaried positions).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

52

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67: p. 35

once said, “I won’t wipe my nose on the [employment] contract. It’s not
worth the price of the paper.”106
However, that does not prevent the parties from bargaining over certain protections. Coaches try to guard their financial interests through
means including negotiating lengthy, fixed-term contracts.107 However, a
long-term employment contract does not ensure employment for the contract’s full term.108 “[R]isk follows . . . reward[,]” and, “[i]n big-time intercollegiate athletics, the risk to a school making a significant investment in
a [head] coach is that the investment does not result in a successful [athletics] program.”109 Even if an employee under contract performs well,
the employer may breach the contract and terminate the employee.110
Likewise, head coaches are aware that consistent losing on the playing
field likely results in employment termination.111 In either event, the issue becomes what or how much the employer owes the former employee.112 Thus, a head coach’s employment contract “may be the most
important armor that the coach has in protecting his entry and exit in the
job.”113 Coaches should plan for their eventual departure, and the terms
of the employment contract between the coach and the university that
address the back-end of employment may be more important than the
terms addressing the commencement of the coach’s employment.114 The
next Section explores how coaches and universities attempt to protect
themselves contractually in situations where the university desires to terminate the coach’s employment.
106. Roche, supra note 37, at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martin J. Greenberg, Representation of College Coaches in Contract Negotiations, 3
MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 101, 109 (1995)).
107. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 942.
108. Id.
109. Karcher, supra note 61, at 33.
110. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 942 (comparing scenario
whereby a university president performs well but the board of trustees terminates
the president’s employment).
111. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 195 (describing reasons why
head coaches focus on what happens to the parties when coaches leave voluntarily
or involuntarily). “[R]ecent studies . . . show[ ] . . . a tenuous connection between
coaches’ salaries and winning.” Karcher, supra note 61, at 33.
112. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 230 (explaining that the answer depends on the contract and its termination provisions).
113. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 127 (stating that head coaches’ long-term
employment contracts mean nothing as provisions providing for buyouts for termination without cause are rampant); see also Dennie, supra note 82 (explaining that
the parties negotiate and argue the breadth of termination provisions at length).
114. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 128 (“The first day of the job often must
be spent planning for the last day of the job . . . .”); see also Thomas & Van Horn,
supra note 50, at 195. Universities often negotiate protection in the event the head
coach departs the university voluntarily for a more desirable position by implementing a contract buyout that the coach or hiring university will pay. See id.
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College Head Coach Employment Contract Termination Provisions

Terminating the employer-employee relationship is difficult on both
an employer and employee.115 A split between a university and a head
coach can also be expensive.116 College head coach contracts usually contain separate “termination for cause” and “termination without cause” provisions.117 Depending on the provision under which the university
terminates a head coach’s employment, the university may still owe the
coach millions of dollars.118
Employment contracts may also refer to termination “without cause”
as termination absent “just cause,” or “not for cause.”119 A termination
without cause provision provides the university authority to terminate the
contract prior to its end of term date for any reason.120 Common reasons
why universities terminate head coaches without cause include consistent
losses, inadequate fan support, inadequate financial support from donors,
failing to compete with fellow conference members or rivals, and other
reasons that the pertinent contract provisions do not list.121 Further, it is
not uncommon for a new president, chancellor, or athletics director to
seek to make their “mark” on a sport program by bringing in a new coach
and terminating the current coach’s employment without cause.122
When a university terminates a head coach’s employment without
cause, it will likely incur fiscal obligations that can be enormous.123 A
115. See Amy S. Ybarra, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, 24 NO. 11 TEX. EMP. L.
LETTER 7 (2013) (recommending that employers refrain from making headlines
with a termination and citing example of the University of Southern California
terminating Lane Kiffin’s employment as its head football coach).
116. See Greenberg & Paul, supra note 76, at 339. In fact, terminating a head
coach can cause daunting economic implications for universities. See Greenberg &
Gruber, supra note 45, at 144 (citing example of Auburn University terminating
head football coach Gene Chizik’s employment two years after he led Auburn to a
national championship and despite still having to pay Chizik $7.5 million and his
staff $3.59 million).
117. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 205 (describing The Ohio State University’s termination of head men’s basketball coach Jim O’Brien); see also Ross &
Berkstresser, supra note 43, at 720.
118. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52 (contrasting ramifications of terminations for cause and terminations without cause).
119. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 149. In other words, a coach
cannot force a university to permit the coach to continue to work if the university
decides to terminate the coach’s employment or replace the coach with another
individual. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 245. This Article uses the terms “without cause,” “absent just cause,” and “not for cause” interchangeably.
120. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 149; see also Greenberg & Paul,
supra note 76, at 341 (explaining that mitigation of damages found its way into
coaches’ employment contracts through provisions permitting termination without cause and for the university’s own convenience).
121. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 149.
122. Id.
123. See Greenberg & Paul, supra note 76, at 339 (explaining that the employment contract may require the university to pay for the head coach’s remaining
contract years).
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head coach’s employment contract frequently requires their university to
pay the head coach severance payments or common law damages for
breach upon an employment termination without cause.124 Contract provisions that specify the damages amount for breach present several advantages, including predictability.125 The severance amount the university
owes the head coach often equals the full amount of all of the compensation to which the head coach would have been entitled if the parties fully
performed the contract.126 Alternatively, some head coach employment
contracts provide for a minimum of three or five years of base salary in the
event the university terminates a head coach without cause.127 Thus, the
amount a university owes and pays a head coach that it terminated without
cause is, in essence, payment to someone to not perform work for the
university.128
124. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 942 (comparing amounts that
universities owe depending on whether termination was with or without cause); see
also Karcher, supra note 61, at 23. Authors, fans, and media members commonly
refer to the severance payments accompanying terminations without cause as
“buyouts.” See Karcher, supra note 61, at 23–24. For example, see Greenberg,
supra note 44, at 127 (describing buyouts for terminations without cause as “rampant” in college athletics). Others refer to these severance payments as liquidated
damages, which should put the parties on notice of what will occur economically
post-termination. For example, see Dennie, supra note 82 (explaining that liquidated damages clauses in coach contracts are becoming the norm and call for a
predetermined settlement amount). Regardless of nomenclature, the industry
trend is for universities and head coaches to contract around the default consequential damages by quantifying, or liquidating, their damages during contract
negotiations. See Karcher, supra note 41, at 435 (explaining that a buyout is nothing more than a triggered liquidated damages clause). Absent predetermined severance payments, a university terminating a coach without cause must anticipate
having to negotiate a settlement accounting for uninterrupted pay or the net present value of all sums remaining under the contract’s term. Id.
125. See Greenberg & Paul, supra note 76, at 345 (describing parties’ ability to
negotiate damages amount instead of imposition by a court or arbitrators as
advantageous).
126. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 942; see also Karcher, supra note
61, at 24. Given coaches’ relatively short tenures, it is unsurprising that they bargain for greater protection in the event of termination without cause. See Thomas
& Van Horn, supra note 52, at 906 (comparing college head football coach and
university president employment contracts). Losing is costly to a head coach; not
only does it markedly increase the chance of termination, it also reduces their
likelihood of future employment as a head coach. See id. at 913 (explaining why
coaches compensate for this risk by negotiating significant severance payment
provisions).
127. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 953–55 (comparing termination without cause provisions in college head coach and university president employment contracts and concluding that the severance provisions for head coaches
cover more years of base salary, perhaps because head coaches enjoy less job security and negotiate accordingly).
128. See Karcher, supra note 61, at 24 (referring to buyouts as “an additional
cost to schools for keeping coaches on contract that are no longer working for
them”). In fact, two legal scholars describe the money that university officials willingly pay to buy out faltering head coaches’ contracts as the latest symbol of the
college “football arms race.” Greenberg & Paul, supra note 76, at 340.
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For example, Texas A&M University (Texas A&M) terminated head
football coach Kevin Sumlin’s employment without cause in 2017 with two
years remaining on his contract.129 Under the “Damages Upon Termination by University Without Cause” provision in Sumlin’s contract, Texas
A&M had to pay Sumlin the full amount remaining under his contract—
$10.4 million.130 More recently, LSU terminated the employment of former head football coach Ed Orgeron without cause less than two seasons
after he guided the team to a national championship, thus owing him $17
million in severance.131
With coaching salaries (and severance payments) rising, universities
are increasingly likely to negotiate cumbersome termination provisions to
try and protect their interests.132 As media coverage of college athletics
has amplified, head coaches face an increased risk of employment termination due to their personal conduct that does not relate to on-field performance.133 Thus, universities negotiate termination for cause provisions
to protect their images in the event of employee misconduct.134 These
contract provisions also go by termination “with cause,” termination with
129. See Alex Kirshner, Why Kevin Sumlin’s $10.4 Million Texas A&M Buyout Is
Even Better (for Him) Than It Sounds, SB NATION (Nov. 26, 2017, 4:49 PM), http://
sbnation.com/college-football/2017/11/26/16694462/kevin-sumlin-fired-buyouttexas-a-m-contract [https://perma.cc/J6CU-99UA].
130. See id. Interestingly, Sumlin’s contract did not contain an “offset provision” present in many coach contracts that would offset the amount Sumlin earned
from future employment against the amount Texas A&M owed him. See id. Thus,
when the University of Arizona hired Sumlin seven weeks after Texas A&M fired
him, Sumlin was able to keep the full $10.4 million in severance from A&M while
earning nearly $3 million annually to coach at Arizona. See Alex Kirshner, Kevin
Sumlin’s at Arizona Now, After Collecting a Huge Buyout From Texas A&M, SB NATION
(Aug. 30, 2018, 6:30 PM), http://sbnation.com/college-football/2018/8/30/
17625318/kevin-sumlin-arizona-texas-a-m-coach [https://perma.cc/2EEX-LXBA].
131. See Chip Patterson, LSU, Coach Ed Orgeron Agree to Part Ways at Conclusion
of 2021 College Football Season, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 17, 2021), http://cbssports.com/
college-football/news/lsu-coach-ed-orgeron-agree-to-part-ways-at-conclusion-of2021-college-football-season/ [https://perma.cc/93JE-FQYL] (quoting LSU athletics director Scott Woodward as explaining that the football program was not competing for “SEC and national championships”).
132. See Dennie, supra note 82 (describing universities as “tightening the
reins”).
133. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 230–31 (explaining inclusion
of termination with cause option in head coach employment contracts).
134. See Adam Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 5, 17 (2011) (explaining that the right to end a working relationship is a natural consideration for contract drafters and parties); see also Thomas &
Van Horn, supra note 52, at 943 (describing termination for cause provisions as
“an important protection” for a university from the damage to its reputation and
image that could arise if a coach engages in serious misconduct). In fact, negotiations regarding the circumstances that can justify termination for cause can become contentious. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 230; see also
Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 147 (stating that “universities and coaches
. . . fight bitterly over what constitutes termination for cause”).
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or for “just cause,” or “for cause termination.”135 They provide the circumstances under which a university may terminate a coach for the
coach’s bad act or harmful omission and relieve the university of its duty
to further compensate the coach.136 If a head coach commits an act that,
per the employment contract, justifies termination for cause, the university may terminate the contract prior to the end of its term.137 A coach
who breaches an employment contract and whose university terminates
the coach’s employment with cause typically is not entitled to severance
compensation.138
The circumstances justifying termination for cause vary depending on
head coach contracts. Such circumstances are often a main focus of head
coach contract negotiations.139 Universities may prefer vague, indefinable
terms.140 Universities often add, or seek to add, language like “shall in135. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 150. This Article uses the
terms interchangeably termination “with cause,” termination “for just cause” and
“for cause termination” interchangably.
136. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 205 (contrasting termination for cause
and termination without cause employment contract provisions generally); see also
Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 942.
137. Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 150.
138. Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 942 (explaining that, as a result,
universities carefully draft definitions for what constitutes cause); see also Greenberg, supra note 44, at 210 (explaining that most college head coach employment
contracts include a clause exonerating the university from any further liability for
compensation following termination with cause). Thus, an employee likely would
prefer a termination without cause from a financial standpoint. See Thomas & Van
Horn, supra note 52, at 942 (noting that counsel for employees will vociferously
resist including strong definitions of cause in their clients’ employment contracts).
Conversely, “universities prefer to terminate a coach’s contract” with cause because
of the hefty severance payments that often accompany termination without cause.
Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 149–50. However, note that termination
for cause proceedings can hang out a university’s dirty laundry in the public, or
involve protracted and expensive litigation that may offend fans and alumni. See
Greenberg, supra note 83, at 230 (explaining that compromise is the current modus operandi when a university seeks to terminate a head coach’s employment
with cause). Thus, a university may prefer to settle its differences with a head
coach it just terminated to control the head coach’s public narrative and prevent
an airing of dirty laundry. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 219 (citing examples
including legendary head football coach Barry Switzer settling with the University
of Oklahoma for $225,000 after the two parted ways in the wake of Switzer’s NCAA
violations). Even if a valid termination for cause circumstance exists, a university
with adequate resources may consider terminating a head coach without cause
because it is the cleanest basis to separate from employment. See Thomas & Van
Horn, supra note 52, at 952.
139. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 209 (explaining that the parties may look to previous contracts between the university and other coaches as
well as other universities’ coach employment contracts).
140. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 147 (describing the situation
as “ripe for potential abuse by universities”). In fact, two legal scholars believe that
termination for cause provisions are often “indefinable, vague, and extremely subjective” in the university’s favor. See id. at 152 (citing “moral turpitude” as an example). Another notes that defining the word “cause” can present problems. See
Epstein, supra note 134, at 17. Universities can use these vague terms like weapons
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clude” or “includes but is not limited to” when listing circumstances that
justify termination with cause in order to protect themselves and provide
flexibility.141 Head coaches and their representatives particularly seek to
avoid provisions permitting universities to unjustifiably or subjectively terminate head coaches’ employment with cause.142 A recent example of a
for cause termination is Washington State University (Washington State)
terminating head football coach Nick Rolovich’s employment after he refused to abide by a state COVID-19 vaccine mandate.143 Because Washington State terminated Rolovich’s employment with cause, Rolovich did not
receive his $2 million annual salary.144
More relevant to this Article, head coach employment contracts typically permit termination with cause for material contract breaches, violating NCAA or conference rules that result in certain sanctions, and
“conduct that constitutes moral turpitude or reflects adversely on the university.”145 Universities hope that, by carefully enumerating offenses that
would trigger termination for cause, they will deter or punish offenders
for their actions.146 A complete loss of severance pay should serve as a
to terminate coaches with cause. Greenberg, supra note 833, at 226. To mitigate
the likelihood that their university may terminate their employment with cause,
coaches seek contract terms that are not subjective. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra
note 50, at 230. Thus, coaches likely prefer contract language that more strictly
defines acts constituting just cause. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 215.
141. Dennie, supra note 82.
142. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 230.
143. See Edward Sutelan, Why Did Washington State Fire Nick Rolovich? Coach’s
Vaccine Refusal at Center of Cougars’ Decision, SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 18, 2021), http://
sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/washington-state-fire-nick-rolovichcoach-vaccine-refusal/13zvz7ypuvm7t15s72ys8a6dbh [https://perma.cc/7RQTU3BE] (describing state mandate prohibiting state agencies from permitting workers not fully vaccinated against COVID-19 to work for them).
144. See id. (quoting “clear lines in Rolovich’s contract that allowed him to be
fired”).
145. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 206, 221 (noting OSU’s head men’s basketball Jim O’Brien’s employment contract included these terms). Additionally, circumstances that can constitute adequate reasoning for termination with cause
often include “perpetuation of willful fraud, conduct seriously prejudicial to the
best interests of the university, immoral acts, habitual intoxication, dishonesty, and
gross negligence.” Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 50, at 230–31. Head coach
contracts also often contain provisions defining neglect of duties as grounds for
termination for cause, which suggests that universities could use poor on-field results to terminate a head coach’s employment for-cause. See id. at 233. However,
this has not been the case. See id.; see also Karcher, supra note 61, at 23 (stating that
it is unfortunate for universities that lack of winning is not a valid reason to terminate a head coach for cause).
146. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 943. However, given the near
certainty coaches terminated with cause will sue their universities for breach of
contract, universities are selective about their use of the just cause distinction.
Michael McCann, Breaking Down Kevin Ollie’s Case Against UConn and the University’s
Likely Defenses, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jun. 29, 2018), http://si.com/college/2018/
06/29/uconn-huskies-kevin-ollie-fired-arbitration-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/2J4K5S4F] (citing Louisivlle’s termination of Pitino with cause as an example after retaining him through multiple scandals).
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significant deterrent.147 Further, a coach terminated with cause likely suffers severe reputational harm.148
3.

NCAA Rules and College Head Coach Employment Contracts

Coaches operate in an “environment controlled by NCAA rules
. . . .”149 Thus, in addition to winning games, head coach are concerned
with their student-athletes’ academic eligibility and amateur status, extra
benefits, boosters’ activities, expense reporting, and recruiting.150 This
Section details the means and processes through which the NCAA enforces its rules and universities’ incorporation of NCAA rules compliance
into head coach employment contracts.
a.

The NCAA and Its Rules Enforcement Process

The NCAA describes itself as “a member-led organization” that consists of over 1,000 colleges and universities.151 Through the NCAA’s legislative process, its member universities propose and adopt rules regarding
college athletics and implement them on campus.152 NCAA member universities and their student-athletes agree to the rules in order to have the
opportunity to compete in NCAA-sponsored competitions.153 The NCAA
notoriously does not lack for rules.154 For example, one NCAA Division I
bylaw defines the term “business day[,]” while others regulate when and
how often coaches may call or write prospective student-athletes, or even
answer incoming calls from them.155
Universities and staff members that abide by NCAA legislation should
not be disadvantaged by doing so.156 Thus, NCAA member universities
147. See Thomas & Van Horn, supra note 52, at 943.
148. See id. (noting that coaches aggressively negotiate limitations to what
constitutes cause in their employment contracts); see also Greenberg & Gruber,
supra note 45, at 213 (explaining that a termination with cause provision can interfere with a coach’s future, both financially and professionally).
149. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 146 (describing NCAA rules as a “voluminous, complicated and very often broken set of guidelines”).
150. See id. at 147.
151. What Is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/8R5F-ZGTC] (last visited Feb. 28,
2022) (providing basic information regarding the NCAA).
152. See id. (noting these rules include “everything from recruiting and compliance to academics and championships”).
153. See Brandon Leibsohn, Road to Recovery: The NCAA’s New Enforcement Process Creates More Legal Headaches, 21 SPORTS LAW J. 123, 126 (2014).
154. NCAA bylaws and policies cover myriad substantive areas, competition
rules, and scheduling. See Jo R. Potuto, The NCAA Rules Adoption, Interpretation,
Enforcement, and Infractions Processes: The Laws that Regulate Them and the Nature of
Court Review, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 257, 262 (2010).
155. NCAA, 2020-21 DIVISION I MANUAL § 13.02.1, 13.1.3, 13.4.1 (2020), http:/
/ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE5T-GCYU]
[hereinafter 2020-21 MANUAL].
156. See Elizabeth Lombard, Note, Changes Are Not Enough: Problems Persist with
NCAA’s Adjudicative Policy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925, 928 (2019) (describing
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created an infractions process to help ensure fair play and integrity among
members.157 One group of NCAA employees in particular bears this responsibility: the NCAA’s Enforcement Staff.158 The Enforcement Staff
consists of a few dozen individuals, including former coaches, athletics administrators, compliance staff members, student-athletes, and attorneys.159
The Enforcement Staff is akin to the NCAA’s prosecutor.160 It is the
NCAA entity responsible for reviewing information about potential violations.161 The Enforcement Staff receives information regarding potential
rule violations from many sources, including self-reports and sources.162
If a situation warrants further investigation, the Enforcement Staff issues a
Notice of Inquiry to, and works with, the involved member university to
discover the facts.163 By sending a Notice of Inquiry to the university, the
Enforcement Staff indicates the commencement of a formal, joint investiNCAA’s infractions process’s purpose). Conversely, without rules, enforcement,
and an infractions system to find and punish rules violators, unscrupulous coaches
and staff members would have a field day. See Potuto, supra note 154, at 262.
157. See NCAA, Division I Infractions Process, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/enforcement/division-i-infractions-process [https://perma.cc/TLQ3-QK3A] (last visited
Feb. 28, 2022) [hereinafter Division I Infractions Process].
158. See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA DIVISION I INFRACTIONS
2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (June 2020), http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/infractions/d1/2019D1Inf_AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z29K-PT6J] [hereinafter DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT] (describing Enforcement
Staff’s role in the infractions process). Under NCAA rules, member universities
are responsible for enforcing compliance, but if a university is unaware of, or contributing to, NCAA rules violations, the NCAA may act on its own. See Leibsohn,
supra note 153, at 126.
159. Evaluations Show Infractions Process Improvements, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/evaluations-show-infractions-process-improvements [https://perma.cc/AUP8-T7HX] (describing efforts
to improve infractions process and noting the Enforcement Staff consisted of fiftyseven individuals in 2016); see also Inside the Division I Infractions Process: Who’s Who
in the Infractions Process, NCAA, http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/infractions/
d1/glnc_grphcs/D1INF_InfractionWhoisWho.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3QFJTKG] (last visited June 10, 2021) (describing individuals and their roles in the
infractions process).
160. See Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, Majoring in Infractions: The
Evolution of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Enforcement Structure, 92 OR. L.
REV. 979, 988 (2014) (describing the Enforcement Staff’s actions to include
presenting information to support allegations of rules infractions to the COI); see
also Mike Rogers & Rory Ryan, Navigating the Bylaw Maze in NCAA Major Infractions
Cases, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 749, 753–54 (2007) (noting that Enforcement Staff
members are full-time NCAA employees).
161. See Division I Infractions Process, supra note 157.
162. See Inside the Infractions Process: Paths for Handling Potential Violations,
NCAA (Jan. 2020) http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/infractions/d1/
glnc_grphcs/D1INF_ResolutionPathsforViolations.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEB9KBXF] (illustrating various resolution paths for potential violations). The Enforcement Staff may receive tips on potential violations from university self-reports,
rival coaches, media stories, anonymous tips, and disgruntled staff members or
student-athletes. See Potuto, supra 154, at 289–90.
163. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 7.
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gation of, and with, the university.164 Its investigators must review information regarding potential violations in a “fair, accurate, collaborative,
and timely manner.”165
If the Enforcement Staff believes information may substantiate violations, it alleges potential Level I or Level II violations, with the former
being the more significant of the two.166 The Enforcement Staff states its
allegations in a formal document directed to the university and involved
individuals called a Notice of Allegations (NOA).167 The Enforcement
Staff bears the burden of proving these violations.168
There are four means by which an infractions case involving a Division I member university resolves, and three of them conclude with a COI
decision.169 The COI is an independent administrative body that includes
volunteers from NCAA member universities, athletics conferences, former
coaches, and individuals from the general public who possess legal training.170 More specifically, panelists’ professional profiles include current
and former university presidents, chancellors, and athletics directors, conference commissioners, former coaches, attorneys, and professors.171
164. See Jerry R. Parkinson, Scoundrels: An Inside Look at the NCAA Infractions
and Enforcement Processes, 12 WYO. L. REV. 215, 226 (2012) (explaining that the investigation goes “wherever else the evidence leads”). The Notice of Inquiry is not
an allegation; rather, it informs the university of a formal investigation. See Rogers
& Ryan, supra note 160, at 765.
165. DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 9
(characterizing trust and collaboration between the Enforcement Staff, universities, and conferences as “vital” to the process).
166. See id. at 7 (providing overview of infractions process). There are three
violation levels. See id. at 9. The COI adjudicates cases involving alleged levels I
and II violations, whereas, for the most part, the Enforcement Staff and universities handle Level III violations. See id. For context, the Enforcement Staff alleged
an average of ninety-one Level I or II violations per year between 2017 and 2019.
See id. at 11 (providing data regarding Enforcement Staff allegations). For further
context, the COI hosted six hearings over disputed allegations in 2019. See id. at
12.
167. Parkinson, supra note 164, at 226 (noting that the Enforcement Staff
directs the notice to the university’s president or chancellor).
168. See id. at 224 (noting that the COI has concluded that the Enforcement
Staff has not met its burden “plenty” of times).
169. See Division I Infractions Process, supra note 157 (illustrating the four
means by which a case resolves and showing that three end with a COI adjudication). “The jurisdictional responsibility of the COI is to hear and resolve cases of
institutional culpability.” Potuto, supra note 154, at 295.
170. Division I Committee on Infractions, NCAA, http://ncaa.org/governance/
committees/division-i-committee-infractions [https://perma.cc/2YPM-4BAE] (last
visited Feb. 28, 2022).
171. See Inside the Division I Infractions Process: Division I Committee on Infractions
Composition, NCAA (Jan. 2019), http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/infractions/
d1/glnc_grphcs/D1INF_COIComposition-FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PU5K-TTTL] [hereinafter Inside the Division I Infractions Process: Composition] (explaining that a panel’s size for each individual case is between three and seven COI
members).
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Thus, the COI touts the infractions process as “peer-review[ed].”172
There are up to twenty-four COI members at any given time, a smaller
panel of which considers each case on the COI’s behalf.173
NCAA Division I legislation places extra responsibility and accountability on head coaches.174 More specifically, Division I legislation
presumes that head coaches are responsible for the actions of those who
report to them.175 Under NCAA Bylaw 11.1.1.1, whether the head coach
knew of a staff member’s actions is irrelevant.176 Even when a head coach
is unaware—or claims lack of awareness—of a staff member’s actions, the
COI presumes the head coach should have been aware.177 In addition to
imposing a presumption of responsibility on the head coach for violations
in the sport program, Bylaw 11.1.1.1 requires head coaches to “promote
an atmosphere of compliance,” and “monitor the activities of all institutional staff members . . . who report, directly or indirectly, to the
coach.”178
The current version of Bylaw 11.1.1.1 has been effective since August
1, 2013.179 Since its implementation, and relative to other NCAA rules for
which it could allege violations, the Enforcement Staff uses it often and
172. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 5
(describing infractions process’s framework). For discussion regarding the benefits of judgment by peers, see Gene A. Marsh, A Call for Dissent and Further Independence in the NCAA Infractions Process, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 695, 709 (2009)
(recommending, among other things, more independent members on the COI).
For discussion regarding whether the process is actually peer reviewed for coaches,
see Josh Lens, The NCAA Infractiosn Process and Peer Review, OHIO STATE L.J. ONLINE
(forthcoming 2022).
173. See Inside the Division I Infractions Process: Composition, supra note 171.
174. For a more in-depth analysis of NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation, see Josh Lens, The Propriety of Incorporating Enforcement Staff Declination Statements Into the NCAA Infractions Process Following Bylaw 11.1.1.1 Head Coach
Responsibilities Investigations, 100 NEB. L. REV. 483 (2021).
175. 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 11.1.1.1.
176. See id.; see also Nicole Auerbach, Coaches Recognize NCAA Demand to Be More
Accountable, USA TODAY (July 11, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
ncaab/2013/07/11/college-basketball-coaches-rule-monitoring/2510215/
[https://perma.cc/RM89-MZH7] (describing “new world of NCAA enforcement
and greater responsibility” for head coaches).
177. See Dennis Dodd, Inside College Football: Hugh Freeze Faces an NCAA Issue
Calipari, Carroll Avoided, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/
college-football/news/inside-college-football-hugh-freeze-faces-an-issue-caliparicarroll-avoided/ [https://perma.cc/96YD-ZMYK] (explaining how NCAA legislation holds head coaches accountable for what happens within their programs in
the context of Hugh Freeze’s actions related to the Ole Miss football program
between 2012 and 2016).
178. 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 11.1.1.1.
179. See id. Under the previous version of the legislation, head coaches were
presumed only knowledgeable of—as opposed to responsible for—actions of staff members who report to them. See Meaningful Penalties Align with Significance of Wrongdoing, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2013), http://ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/
meaningful-penalties-align-significance-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/V3HDNFLQ].
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aggressively. Since 2014, the Enforcement Staff has alleged more Level I
or II violations of Bylaw 11.1.1.1 than any other of the hundreds of bylaws
in the NCAA manual.180 Further, between 2014 and 2018, head coaches
committed twenty-seven percent of Level I and Level II violations, the
most of any position in college athletics.181 In 2019, head coaches committed a whopping fifty-two percent of all violations. For context, assistant
coaches were the next highest group at fifteen percent.182
A head coach’s NCAA rule violation can be extremely costly, not only
for the head coach, but also for the university. It can cost a university
millions of dollars to investigate NCAA violations and traverse the NCAA’s
infractions process.183 In 2015, for example, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill reported that it spent over $10 million for legal and public relations assistance with its academic fraud scandal.184 In addition to
financial costs, universities suffer reputational harm due to involvement in
NCAA enforcement scandals.185
b.

College Head Coach Employment Contracts’ Incorporation of
NCAA Rules

Some head coaches with “win-at-all-costs attitude[s]” willingly place
their careers above their universities’ futures by taking chances with actions that violate NCAA rules.186 When caught, penalties for rule break180. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 11
(showing that the Enforcement Staff alleged eighteen Level I and II Head Coach
Responsibilities violations in 2019, which was the most of any bylaw).
181. NCAA DIV. 1 COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA DIVISION I INFRACTIONS
2018-19 ANNUAL REPORT 17, http://ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018-infractionsannual-report_0.pdf [permalink unavailable].
182. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at
12.
183. See Stangel, supra note 38, at 139 (describing the $1.9 million cost to the
University of Minnesota to investigate academic fraud in its men’s basketball program and noting that the University also had to pay then-head coach Clem Haskins
a $1.5 million buyout and NCAA financial penalties).
184. See UNC-CH’s Total Price Tag For Academic Scandal Tops $10M, WRAL (Oct.
26, 2015, 5:45 PM), http://wral.com/unc-ch-paid-7-6m-for-legal-pr-help-in-academic-scandal/15022416/ [https://perma.cc/TN3F-8XT9]. The UNC case featured academic courses that the enforcement staff felt were less-than-rigorous and
unfairly benefited student-athletes. See Pat Forde, Baylor’s Slap on the Wrist Doesn’t
Feel Right, But There’s Not Much NCAA Rules Could Do, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11,
2021), http://si.com/college/2021/08/11/baylor-football-ncaa-sanctions-investigation [https://perma.cc/W5U9-XZZ9] (describing the UNC case as one of the
“most significant scandals of the past decade”). However, because the classes were
available to non-athlete students, in addition to student-athletes, the COI concluded that the classes did not violate NCAA legislation. See id.
185. See Stangel, supra note 38, at 139 (citing University of Minnesota example and quoting then-Chairwoman of the Higher Education Finance Committee in
Minnesota as stating “significant harm” to the University’s reputation resulted
from its academic fraud scandal in its men’s basketball program).
186. See id. at 152–53 (describing knowingly violating NCAA rules as
“inexcusable”).
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ing greatly impact universities’ options for terminating their coaches’
employment.187 Virtually every head coach employment contract states
that it is a head coach’s duty to abide by, and comply with, the NCAA’s
constitution, bylaws, and interpretations as well as all rules of the conference to which the university belongs.188 Universities double down on the
importance of head coaches following NCAA rules by including failure to
follow NCAA rules as grounds for termination for cause.189 More specifically, common contract language states that “a deliberate or serious violation, material in nature, of any law, regulation, constitutional provision or
bylaw of . . . the NCAA” that reflects adversely on the university or its athletics program, or that results in the NCAA placing the university on probation, constitutes a basis for termination with cause.190 A violation
finding by the COI, as opposed to the university, is usually a prerequisite
for just cause.191
Because of Bylaw 11.1.1.1, a head coach’s employment contract also
likely includes language providing the university cause for terminating the
head coach’s employment if a staff member engages in serious violations
that the head coach failed to reasonably supervise.192 For example, consider University of Michigan (Michigan) head football coach Jim Harbaugh’s employment contract. Michigan can terminate Harbaugh’s
employment with cause upon “a material violation of a material provision”
of NCAA rules within the football program that occurs as a result of Harbaugh’s “failure to appropriately supervise the Program in a reasonable
and customary manner.”193
Thus, head coaches who violate NCAA rules, or oversee staff members
who do so, not only face potential NCAA penalties but also may breach
their employment contracts.194 When a university’s head coach commits a
187. Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 194.
188. See id. (providing example contract language from coaches’ contracts including now-former Texas Tech University head football coach Kliff Kingsbury).
The inclusion of university, conference, and NCAA rules is an “important aspect”
of coaches’ contracts. Stangel, supra note 38, at 153.
189. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 194 (providing examples, including language from Kingsbury’s contract). Because of Bylaw 11.1.1.1, universities may contractually require coaches to take all reasonable steps to ensure staff
members comply with NCAA rules. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 147, 209.
190. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 147 (noting that the contract also likely
references conference or university rules, which are less relevant to this Article).
191. Stangel, supra note 38, at 154.
192. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 147, 210; see also Greenberg & Gruber,
supra note 45, at 151–52 (referring to such a clause as “[t]he newest catch-all”); see
also Stangel, supra note 38, at 154 (explaining that just cause usually requires a
major violation by the head coach or a staff member of which the head coach was
aware).
193. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AND
JAMES J. HARBAUGH § 4.02(d) (Dec. 28, 2014).
194. See Stangel, supra note 38, at 153; see also Greenberg, supra note 44, at 147
(explaining that NCAA rule violations can have a dramatic effect on a coach’s
career, including a university terminating an employment contract for the coach’s
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significant NCAA violation, the university must determine whether to retain the coach, and at what cost.195 For example, under his contract in
place at the time federal authorities implicated Self and Kansas, Kansas
would have owed $5.4 million to Self even if it fired him for committing
major NCAA rules violations.196 The following Section further explores
the situation whereby universities must make an employment decision regarding a rule breaking head coach.
II. UNIVERSITIES’ EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS REGARDING HEAD COACHES
INVOLVED IN NCAA RULES VIOLATIONS
The instances in which a university terminated a head coach’s employment for NCAA rules violations are numerous. Notable examples include the University of Nevada, Las Vegas firing head men’s basketball
coach Jerry Tarkanian, the University of Washington firing head football
coach Rick Neuheisel, and both the University of Oklahoma (Oklahoma)
and Indiana University (Indiana) firing head men’s basketball coach
Kelvin Sampson.197 More recently, the University of Tennessee (Tennessee) terminated head football coach Jeremy Pruitt’s employment due to
alleged violations of NCAA recruiting rules.198
The instances in which a university terminated a head coach for cause
for involvement in NCAA violations without having to pay the coach severance is fewer, however. This Part examines select instances where the
NCAA implicated a head coach in NCAA rules violations, forcing their
universities to make a decision regarding the coach’s employment. As
these examples illustrate, universities sometimes choose to continue to
employ their head coaches, possibly due to the coach’s success or because
the employment contract renders the alternative cost prohibitive. Other
breach). One legal scholar opines that the fiscal consequences for a head coach
who breaches an employment contract by violating NCAA rules are worse than any
consequences emanating from NCAA sanctions. See Selvaggi, supra note 76, at 227.
195. See Schrotenboer et al., supra note 54 (explaining that a university must
perform its own risk calculation).
196. See id. (describing Self’s contract provision as “leverage” and noting that
it differs “starkly with other coaches’ contracts”).
197. See Courtney Bru, Hoosier Legal Adviser Sampson? The Dangers of Terminating Without ‘Just Cause’, 16 NO. 5 OKLA. EMP. L. LETTER 5 (2008) (advising employers to proceed carefully and comply with any procedural requirements before and
when terminating for cause). By terminating Sampson for cause, Indiana avoided
having to pay Sampson $2.5 million in severance under his contract. See id. Washington terminated Neuheisel for cause for violating NCAA rules by participating in
an NCAA basketball pool, and UNLV terminated Tarkanian for cause for NCAA
violations. Id. As of March 2022, Kelvin Sampson serves as the University of Houston’s head men’s basketball coach.
198. See Rachel Treisman, University of Tennessee Fires Head Football Coach Over
Alleged Recruitment Violations, NPR (Jan. 18, 2021), http://npr.org/2021/01/18/
958132859/university-of-tennessee-fires-head-football-coach-over-alleged-recruitment-viola [https://perma.cc/3QFJ-4J9T] (quoting chancellor Donde Plowman as
explaining that Pruitt “did not meet the university’s expectations for promoting an
atmosphere of compliance” and monitoring his staff).
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times, universities separate from their head coaches, sometimes with no
further obligation to provide compensation and other times continuing to
compensate the coaches. University administrators could potentially save
their universities millions by heeding these examples.
A.

Instances Where a University Made an Employment Decision Regarding a
Head Coach Involved with NCAA Rules Violations and
Ramifications of the Employment Decision

Prominent coaches who were both successful on the court and involved in NCAA violations include head men’s basketball coaches Clem
Haskins, Jim O’Brien, Kelvin Sampson, and Bruce Pearl.199 Because their
situations shaped how universities draft modern head coach employment
contracts, this Section begins with a brief analysis of them before moving
on to more recent instances from which universities can continue to
learn.200
1.

Clem Haskins

In 1999, former University of Minnesota (Minnesota) tutor Jan
Gangelhoff disclosed to local media that she had written about 400 research papers and completed exams for twenty men’s basketball studentathletes during the tenure of then-head coach Clem Haskins.201 Haskins
denied any wrongdoing but resigned a few months later.202
199. Other scholars have covered these scenarios from varying angles. See,
e.g., Epstein, supra note 134, at 18 (referring to the O’Brien, Sampson, and Pearl
scenarios as a “triumvirate”); see also Greenberg, supra note 83. Scholars have also
written about Neuheisel’s employment termination and subsequent lawsuit against
the University of Washington and the NCAA. However, Neuheisel’s scenario is less
relevant to this Article as, while Washington terminated his employment for violating NCAA rules regarding gambling and cooperating during the ensuing investigation, his lawsuit centered on whether he received appropriate and sufficient
process during and following his employment termination. For further discussion,
see Greenberg, supra note 83, at 231–35.
200. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 134, at 18–19 (explaining that “O’Brien’s
case set an example for university counsel, athletics directors and contract drafters
to tighten college coaching contracts”); see also Greenberg, supra note 83 (describing adjustments Ohio State made in O’Brien’s successor’s contract).
201. See Associated Press, Minnesota to Sue Haskins, CBS NEWS (Sept. 11, 2000,
6:35 PM), http://cbsnews.com/news/minnesota-to-sue-haskins/ [https://
perma.cc/NNQ6-ZKD7]. “The subjects of these papers ranged from acid rain to
Native American relations to premenstrual syndrome.” Frank J. Ferraro, When Athletics Engulfs Academics: Violations Committed by University of Minnesota Basketball, 1
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 14 (2003).
202. See Associated Press, supra note 201 (noting Haskins resigned three
months after Gangelhoff disclosed the impermissible academic assistance). Amid
rumors regarding the academic misconduct in the men’s basketball program, the
University and its regents wanted Haskins to “disappear” but were constrained by
Haskins’s employment agreement. Sara A. Elliott, Richard M. Southall, Mark S.
Nagel, Paul J. Batista & James T. Reese, The Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Haskins: The University of Minnesota Men’s Basketball Academic Fraud Scandal—
A Case Study, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 121, 125 (2003).
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Upon his resignation, Minnesota paid Haskins $1.5 million to buy out
the years remaining on his contract.203 The parties formed their buyout
agreement under the “unjust cause” provisions in Haskins’s employment
contract.204 The agreement required Haskins to “cooperate with the university’s investigation” and, if Haskins did not, provided the University “the
right to require specific performance through legal action.”205 At the
time the parties reached the buyout agreement, Minnesota’s president
stated there was “no proof” that Haskins engaged in wrongdoing.206 Haskins continued to deny Gangelhoff’s allegations during the University’s
nine-month, $2.2 million investigation.207
In 2000, Minnesota learned that Haskins acknowledged to NCAA investigators he paid Gangelhoff $3,000 for committing academic fraud.208
Because he lied during the investigation in violation of the buyout agreement, Minnesota sued Haskins to recover the $1.5 million.209 The lawsuit
included fraud, deceit, and breach of contract claims.210 The parties
203. See Stangel, supra note 38, at 139 (noting the University’s investigation
implicated Haskins). Haskins and Minnesota agreed to a ten-year extension of his
original contract in 1992. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 221.
204. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 223.
205. Id.
206. FCCNN Administrator, University Sues Haskins for Return of Buyout, BRAINERD DISPATCH (Sept. 12, 2000), http://brainerddispatch.com/sports/universitysues-haskin-return-buyout [https://perma.cc/GX2Q-BPV5] (noting the University’s president had to “defend[ ]” the buyout at the time). Minnesota likely recognized it lacked legally sufficient evidence to support a just cause termination under
Haskins’s employment contract, and its president publicly thanked Haskins for his
“thirteen years of service . . . and . . . [wished] him a future of success and good
health.” Elliott et al., supra note 202, at 122, 129.
207. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 223 (describing Haskins’s denials); see
also Associated Press, supra note 201 (describing investigation and fallout including
two University administrators departing and self-imposed penalties like recruiting
restrictions and a postseason ban). Other individuals who worked with the men’s
basketball program reported, among other things, that Haskins “asked [them] to
do course work” for student-athletes, that Haskins intimidated them after reporting suspicions that student-athletes cheated, and that “faculty members felt pressured to keep players eligible.” Cheating Scandal Timeline, MINN. PUB. RADIO, http:/
/news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/199903/11_newsroom_cheating/timeline.shtml [https://perma.cc/YS82-WTB2] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
208. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 223.
209. See FCCNN Administrator, supra note 206 (quoting University attorney
Lorie Gildea as stating, “The university got ripped off, and we want our money
back”).
210. See id. (noting that a federal grand jury also pursued the matter because
some of the involved individuals submitted fraudulent coursework through the
mail). For more specific information regarding the University’s lawsuit, see Elliott
et al., supra note 202, at 132–34. Haskins’s attorneys asked the court to dismiss the
University’s lawsuit, arguing that the University violated a clause in the buyout
agreement by not trying to resolve the dispute before going to court. See Haskins in
Salary Flap With School, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 10, 2000), http://apnews.com/article/a9cd23cd1237cae49cbdb2d307bd92566 [permalink unavailable] The University contended this argument was flawed because Haskins committed fraud,
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agreed to permit an arbitrator resolve the dispute, and the arbitrator ordered Haskins to return $815,000 of the $1.5 million.211
Haskins’s employment contract had permitted Minnesota to terminate him with just cause in the event of a major NCAA violation involving
Haskins.212 The contract specifically stated, “Determination of violation
of a rule of [the NCAA] shall require a finding by the [NCAA].”213 In
2000, the COI released its sixty-page public report adjudicating numerous
alleged NCAA violations in connection with the matter and concluding
Haskins “was knowledgeable about and complicit in the academic fraud
. . . .”214 The COI described the violations in the men’s basketball program as “among the most serious academic fraud violations to come
before it in the past 20 years.”215 The COI cited Haskins for, among other
violations, failing to act ethically.216 The COI imposed penalties including
placing Minnesota on probation for four years, reducing the number of
athletics scholarships in its men’s basketball program, and recruiting restrictions.217 The COI also placed a seven-year show-cause order on Has-

rendering the agreement, including the dispute resolution clause, unenforceable.
Id.
211. See Associated Press, Judge Rules Haskins Must Return $815,000, J. TIMES
(May 14, 2002), https://journaltimes.com/news/state-and-regional/judge-ruleshaskins-must-return-815-000/article_1dc4e049-85f1-5161-bf26-576f56063941.html
[permalink unavailable] (explaining that since $425,000 of the buyout was deferred compensation, the award meant the University would receive $1.075 million
of the buyout). Perhaps the University was motivated to arbitrate after a federal
judge dismissed a felony fraud charge against Gangelhoff for misappropriating
federal Pell Grant funds for a men’s basketball student-athlete and rejected a plea
agreement that required her to testify against Haskins. See Todd Milbourn, Judge
Dismisses Charge, Gangelhoff Goes Free, MINN. DAILY (Sept. 26, 2000), http://
mndaily.com/217560/uncategorized/judge-dismisses-charge-gangelhoff-goes-free
[https://perma.cc/KSY4-CV9Y] (quoting Hamline University law professor as explaining Gangelhoff would have been the “star witness” against Haskins). The arbitration followed an unsuccessful mediation attempt and denial of Haskins’s
summary judgment motion. See Elliott et al., supra note 202, at 135–36.
212. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 221 (quoting Haskins’s employment
contract and pointing out that Minnesota would still owe Haskins deferred compensation if it terminated him with just cause).
213. Id. at 222.
214. Press Release, Jack H. Friedenthal, Chair, NCAA Division I Committee
on Infractions, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Public Infraction Report 3
(Oct. 24, 2000), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102169 [https://perma.cc/J7MD-XXVL].
215. Id. (describing violations as “significant, widespread and intentional” and
undermining “the bedrock foundation of a university and the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program”).
216. See id. at 17 (describing, among other ways he acted unethically, Haskins’s attempts at influencing student-athletes’ testimony during NCAA
interviews).
217. See id. at 28–30.
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kins.218 Given the COI’s findings, Minnesota would have had just cause to
terminate Haskins’s employment had he not resigned.
2.

Jim O’Brien219

Jim O’Brien and OSU’s men’s basketball program enjoyed immense
success during his head coaching tenure from 1997 to 2004.220 Despite
his achievements, OSU terminated O’Brien’s employment in June
2004.221 O’Brien’s dismissal stemmed from his dealings with, and recruitment of, highly-regarded prospective student-athlete Aleksandar
Radojevic.222 While recruiting Radojevic, O’Brien funneled $6,000
through an assistant coach to Radojevic’s relative or guardian, purportedly
to assist Radojevic’s family in a war-torn region of Yugoslavia.223 Further,
O’Brien did not report his awareness of the fact that Radojevic had signed
with a professional team in Yugoslavia and received compensation for playing for the team. Signing with a professional team made Radojevic a professional, rendering him ineligible to play college basketball.224 In fact,
O’Brien signed a standard NCAA form attesting that he had reported any
NCAA rules violations of which he was aware.225 Radojevic signed a National Letter of Intent to play for OSU but neither enrolled nor played
there after the NCAA learned of Radojevic’s professional contract in February 1999.226
O’Brien disclosed the payment to Radojevic to OSU’s athletics director in 2004.227 OSU reacted by notifying O’Brien of its intent to terminate
218. See id. at 29. For additional information on NCAA show-cause penalties,
see Josh Lens, Voiding the NCAA Show-Cause Penalty: Analysis and Ramifications of a
California Court Decision, and Where College Athletics and Show-Cause Penalties Go From
Here, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 21 (2020).
219. O’Brien’s legal dispute with OSU is a “prominent” and “contemporary”
contract and employment case. Adam Epstein, Ohio and Sports Law, 25 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 363, 368 (2015).
220. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 197–98 (noting O’Brien’s successes included leading Ohio State to the 1999 men’s Final Four, multiple Big Ten Conference championships, and multiple NCAA men’s basketball tournament
appearances and receiving numerous coaching awards).
221. See id. at 198.
222. See id. at 198–99 (describing Radojevic’s recruitment).
223. See id. at 199–200 (noting that O’Brien described the payment as a loan
that he believed was permissible under NCAA rules).
224. See id. at 199.
225. Id. at 200 (describing O’Brien signing the NCAA Certificate of
Compliance).
226. See id. at 199–200 (noting that OSU had to declare Radojevic ineligible
for athletics participation and apply for reinstatement of his eligibility, which the
NCAA denied). “In the summer of 1999, Radojevic entered the National Basketball Association (NBA) draft and was selected twelfth overall by the Toronto Raptors.” Id. at 200.
227. See id. at 201 (explaining O’Brien worried the payment could become
public through a lawsuit).
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his employment.228 More specifically, OSU offered O’Brien the choice of
resigning or having his employment terminated for cause because he
breached his contract by failing to comply with NCAA rules and report
violations he had “reasonable cause” to believe occurred.229 The notification informed O’Brien that under either choice, OSU had no obligation
to further compensate him.230 O’Brien had three years remaining on his
employment contract at the time.231
OSU terminated O’Brien’s employment later that day.232 In the ensuing NCAA infractions case, the COI determined violations occurred and
required OSU to pay back $800,000 in NCAA tournament revenue and
imposed penalties including probation and forfeiture of records and wins
between 1999 and 2002, stripping OSU of its 1999 Final Four and conference titles.233 Further, O’Brien received a five-year show-cause penalty
largely due to the same conduct that resulted in OSU terminating his
employment.234
O’Brien’s subsequent lawsuit against OSU argued it lacked “cause”
under the contract’s definition.235 Under O’Brien’s contract, OSU could
terminate him for cause if, in relevant part: (1) O’Brien materially
breached it; or (2) O’Brien knew or should have known of an NCAA violation that led to an NCAA investigation and resulted in sanctions including
probation.236 OSU asserted it possessed cause because O’Brien materially
breached his contract.237 More specifically, OSU alleged O’Brien not only
violated NCAA rules when he made the payment to Radojevic’s family and
made matters worse when he failed to report the violation.238 However,
O’Brien argued that the contract’s language required the NCAA to issue
sanctions against OSU for OSU to possess cause.239 Thus, per O’Brien,
there could be no breach until the NCAA issued sanctions.240 O’Brien
pointed out that the NCAA had not penalized OSU at the time it termi228. Id. at 202–04 (quoting letter).
229. See id. at 203 (quoting notification).
230. See id.
231. See Epstein, supra note 134, at 18. After a successful 1998-99 season, OSU
rewarded O’Brien by extending his contract term by eight years and significantly
increasing his compensation. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 200–01.
232. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 204 (noting that O’Brien requested additional time in which to reach a decision, but OSU refused).
233. See id. (explaining that erasing these records means that OSU technically
did not win any games between 1999 and 2002).
234. WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW: COACHING
CONTRACTS § 16:8 (2011).
235. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 205, 208.
236. See id. at 201, 205–06 (describing contract’s language as “favorable to
O’Brien”).
237. See id. at 208.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 208–09.
240. See id.
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nated his employment, and thus, OSU lacked cause at the time.241 As a
result, O’Brien contended that OSU owed him liquidated and compensatory damages under the contract.242
The Ohio Court of Claims held that O’Brien breached his contract
when he had reasonable cause to believe he violated NCAA rules by making the payment to Radojevic’s family and failed to disclose the potential
NCAA violation.243 Despite this determination, the court concluded that
OSU lacked cause to terminate O’Brien’s employment under the contract.244 More specifically, “the court determined that O’Brien’s breach
was not material, and therefore, under the language of the contract, OSU
did not have cause” to fire O’Brien.245 The court emphasized that the
impermissible payment for Radojevic’s family was isolated and “not so
egregious as to frustrate the essential purpose of that contract and thus
render future performance by [OSU] impossible.”246 After OSU appealed
the Court of Claims ruling, the Court of Appeals of Ohio noted, “OSU was
the drafting party. OSU is not lacking in sophistication, and has only been
prejudiced as a result of being held to its own bargain.”247 Thus, OSU had
to pay O’Brien in accordance with the contract’s termination without
cause provision, and a jury awarded O’Brien $2.25 million in liquidated
damages.248 The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the award on appeal.249
“O’Brien’s victory over OSU was significant because,” to that point,
“coaches have rarely been successful [in lawsuits] challenging their terminations.”250 In fact, one practitioner accurately predicted that O’Brien’s
241. See id.
242. See id. (noting that O’Brien’s lawsuit sought $6 million in damages).
243. See id. at 221–22 (explaining that the court determined that O’Brien’s
actions following the loan signaled he had reasonable cause to believe he had committed a violation).
244. Id. at 222.
245. Id. (noting that the court looked at the common law meaning of material breach as well as the Restatement of Contracts); see also Dennie, supra note 82.
The trial judge read O’Brien’s employment contract to mean that OSU “anticipated retaining O’Brien . . . even if he committed a major violation bearing on
prospective eligibility and then failed to disclose,” his violation even “at the very
time [OSU] pursued a reinstatement request for the prospect.” Potuto, supra
note 154, at 269. Within college athletics, the judge’s interpretation of the contract was inconceivable for a university concerned with institutional control and its
standing among fellow NCAA member universities. Id. at 268–69.
246. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 224 (quoting O’Brien v. Ohio State Univ.,
No. 2004-10230, 2006 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 52, *P169 (2006)); see also Dennie, supra
note 82.
247. Epstein, supra note 134, at 19 (quoting O’Brien v. Ohio State Univ.,
2007-Ohio-4833, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4316, *P95 (Ct. App. 2007)).
248. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 224 (explaining the court’s rationale).
249. Bru, supra note 197, at 2 (citing the O’Brien scenario as an example of a
university paying millions of dollars to a coach the university believed it had cause
to terminate).
250. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 235.
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case outcome would embolden terminated coaches to pursue litigation
against their former employers.251
After its dispute with O’Brien, OSU made significant changes to his
successor’s employment contract. The contract between OSU and
O’Brien’s successor, Thad Matta, included a wide-ranging list of incidences that would give OSU cause to terminate his employment.252 One
legal scholar described OSU’s contract with Matta as OSU’s attempt to do
“everything possible to avoid another problem like the O’Brien
situation.”253
3.

Kelvin Sampson

While the head men’s basketball coach at Oklahoma, Kelvin Sampson
committed NCAA violations by making hundreds of impermissible recruiting phone calls to prospective student-athletes.254 In its written report adjudicating the violations, the COI stated:
This case is a result of [Sampson’s] complete disregard for Bylaw
13 telephone contact limitations during the four-year timeframe
(2000-04). [Sampson] created and encouraged an atmosphere
among his staff of deliberate noncompliance, rationalizing the
violations as being the result of “prioritizing’ rules.” Though he
acknowledged that he knowingly violated NCAA recruiting legislation, he did not take the phone contact violations seriously.255
As a result, both Oklahoma and the COI imposed significant penalties
on Sampson and the University. Oklahoma’s sanctions included two years
of probation, reduction in men’s basketball athletics scholarships, and

251. Smith, supra note 45 (citing interview with Lattinville).
252. See Greenberg, supra note 83 at 221 (providing examples of occurrences
in Matta’s contract that were not in O’Brien’s contract to include falsification of
records, gambling, and alcohol and drug use and explaining OSU likely included
them in response to situations involving other coaches like Neuheisel and current
West Virginia University head men’s basketball coach Bob Huggins); see also Dennie, supra note 82 (describing Matta’s employment contract as much more stringent, lengthy, and thorough).
253. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 221.
254. See Epstein, supra note 134, at 19–20; see also Press Release, Thomas E.
Yeager, Acting Chair, NCAA Division I Committee on Infractions, University of
Oklahoma Public Infractions Report 1 (May 25, 2006), http://web3.ncaa.org/
lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102281 [https://perma.cc/A657-SB3L]
[hereinafter Oklahoma Public Infractions Report] (describing the University of
Oklahoma’s men’s basketball staff’s 577 impermissible telephone calls, 233 of
which Sampson placed).
255. Oklahoma Public Infractions Report, supra note 254, at 2.
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recruiting restrictions.256 Sampson’s penalties included loss of bonus
compensation and restrictions on recruiting.257
Despite his transgressions and penalties, Indiana hired Sampson as
head coach of its most prized possession—its men’s basketball program.258 To that point, Indiana’s sport programs had not committed any
significant NCAA violations in forty-five years, and many considered its
head men’s basketball coaching position as one of the five best coaching
jobs in the country.259
Based on Sampson’s transgressions at Oklahoma, when Indiana hired
him, it negotiated significant protections in the employment contract.260
Sampson’s employment contract listed fourteen circumstances upon
which Indiana could terminate Sampson’s employment for cause.261
These included:
4. A significant, intentional, or repetitive violation of any law,
rule, regulation, constitutional provision, bylaw or interpretation
of the University, the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA, which
violation may, in the sole judgment of the University, reflect adversely upon the University or its athletics program, including
but not limited to any significant, intentional, or repetitive violation which may result in the University being placed on probation by the Big Ten Conference or the NCAA and including any
violation which may have occurred during any prior employment
256. See id. at 16–21.
257. See id. at 18–19 (noting recruiting restrictions included loss of the ability
to make recruiting phone calls for one year and restrictions on engaging in offcampus recruiting).
258. See Stephen Kriger, Indiana’s Kelvin Sampson: “Fool Me Once, Shame on You;
Fool Me Twice . . .” BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 17, 2008), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/9873-indianas-kelvin-sampson-fool-me-once-shame-on-you-fool-me-twice
(analogizing violating NCAA rules regarding recruiting phone calls to exceeding
the speed limit by five miles per hour yet emphasizing that coaches should follow
the rules). Indiana later admitted that its hiring of Sampson was “risky.” See Press
Release, Josephine R. Potuto, Former Chair, NCAA Diviaion I Committee on Infractions, Indiana University, Bloomington Public Infractions Report 2 (Nov. 25,
2008), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102283
[https://perma.cc/FES2-8D6R] [hereinafter Indiana Public Infractions Report].
For discussion on the propriety and irony of the fact that Sampson gifted
Oklahoma an NCAA investigation and sanctions when he left for a position with a
storied program and a pay raise, see Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning
Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C. L. REV. 551, 569-70 (2011).
259. See Kriger, supra note 258 (describing Indiana’s athletics programs at the
time of Sampson’s hire as “clean”). Prior to Sampson’s Indiana tenure, the COI
had never cited Indiana’s men’s hoops program for a significant NCAA violation.
See T.J. Clifton, Does the Crime Justify the Punishment? An In-Depth Look at the Indiana
University Phone Call Scandal, 6 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 74
(2009).
260. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 214–15 (noting that O’Brien’s scenario
also likely influenced Indiana’s negotiations with Sampson).
261. See id. at 214 (comparing Sampson’s employment contract with that of
his predecessor, Mike Davis); see also Epstein, supra note 134, at 19–20.
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of the Employee at another NCAA member institution and for
which the NCAA could hold the Coach responsible;
...
10. Fraud or dishonesty of Employee in the performance of his
duties or responsibilities under this Agreement;
11. Failure to maintain an environment in which the coaching
staff complies with the NCAA, Big Ten and University rules and
regulations;
...
14. Findings of the NCAA infractions committee referenced in
Section 4.08 that demonstrate serious, intentional, or repetitive
violations and that result in additional significant penalties or
sanctions against the Employee beyond the University of
Oklahoma’s self-imposed sanctions taken against the Employee,
including any action of the NCAA that would materially impair
the Employee’s ability to perform under this Agreement.262
Sampson vowed to put his troubles behind him, and Indiana and its
athletics director elected to believe Sampson would win while following
the rules as had been Indiana’s custom.263
According to one media member, however, “Sampson failed miserably.”264 Indiana discovered, and disclosed to the NCAA, that Sampson
made at least 100 impermissible recruiting calls as Indiana’s coach (while
on probation for the recruiting violations at Oklahoma).265 The Enforcement Staff investigated and issued an NOA describing violations in Indiana’s men’s basketball program.266
262. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 213–14 (quoting EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
BETWEEN INDIANA UNIVERSITY AND KELVIN SAMPSON § 6.02(B) (Apr. 20, 2006)).
263. Kriger, supra note 258. At Sampson’s introductory press conference, he
explained that coaches are human and make mistakes but that he had corrected
them and moved forward. Clifton, supra note 259, at 75. Indiana’s president explained that Sampson’s Oklahoma violations were the university’s number one
concern but the University was confident Sampson could run a clean program. See
id.
264. See Kriger, supra note 258 (describing Sampson’s continued NCAA violations as damaging Sampson and Indiana’s reputations).
265. See Andy Katz, Indiana Gets List of Alleged Violations Related to Phone Calls,
ESPN (Feb. 12, 2008), http://espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/
story?id=3243325 [https://perma.cc/TKA2-S8PH] (describing Sampson’s use of
three-way calls initiated by assistant coaches to attempt to get around telephone
call prohibitions).
266. NCAA Notifies Indiana of Allegations Regarding Men’s Basketball, IND. UNIV.
(Feb. 13, 2008), http://iuhoosiers.com/news/2008/2/13/NCAA_Notifies_Indiana_Of_Allegations_Regarding_Men_s_Basketball [https://perma.cc/ML48GBNH] (quoting now-former Indiana athletics director Rick Greenspan as stating
he was “extremely disappointed” in the allegations regarding Sampson (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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When the Enforcement Staff issued the NOA, Sampson resigned, further decimating Indiana’s men’s basketball program.267 Despite Sampson’s transgressions and their violation of the protections it negotiated in
its employment contract with him, Indiana paid Sampson $750,000 upon
his departure in exchange for Sampson’s agreement to not file a wrongful
termination lawsuit.268
Thus, for the second time, Sampson left a university both prior to the
conclusion of his employment contract term and facing an NCAA investigation and significant sanctions.269 The COI eventually concluded that
Sampson and Indiana’s men’s basketball staff violated both NCAA recruiting rules and recruiting restrictions remaining from the Oklahoma case by
making at least 100 impermissible recruiting calls to prospective studentathletes.270 In fact, the COI described Sampson’s conduct as “unprecedented” in that he “intentionally flouted telephone penalties imposed in
the Oklahoma case.”271 Further, Sampson violated NCAA legislation mandating ethical conduct when he made false and misleading statements during the investigation, resulting in the COI finding that he failed to
maintain head coach responsibilities.272 The COI imposed significant
penalties on Indiana and Sampson.273 Indiana’s penalties included three
years of probation, a reduction in men’s basketball athletics scholarships,
267. See Indiana Public Infractions Report, supra note 258, at 6 (noting that
Indiana only had two men’s basketball student-athletes returning to the program
at the time).
268. See Epstein, supra note 134, at 19–20 (stating “IU was willing to pay the
price, if necessary, by hiring a coach who left a program under investigation by the
NCAA. In the end, IU did.”). An anonymous donor funded $550,000 of the
buyout and the remaining $200,000 came from athletics department funds. David
Wheeler, Indiana U. Men’s Basketball Coach Resigns in Wake of NCAA Charges, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 23, 2008), http://chronicle.com/article/indiana-u-mensbasketball-coach-resigns-in-wake-of-ncaa-charges [permalink unavailable]. If Indiana had terminated Sampson’s employment without cause or not reached the
$750,000 buyout agreement with him, Indiana would have owed him $2.5 million
under his contract. See Bru, supra note 198.
269. These two occasions did not deter the University of Houston from hiring
Sampson following the expiration of his show-cause order resulting from the Indiana violations, and Houston has reaped significant on-court benefits since hiring
Sampson. See Matt Norlander, How Kelvin Sampson Repaired His Career at Houston
and Resurrected the Cougars, Who Are Back in the Final Four, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 30,
2021), http://cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/how-kelvin-sampson-repaired-his-career-at-houston-and-resurrected-the-cougars-who-are-back-in-the-finalfour/ [https://perma.cc/KE8W-FTLU].
270. See Indiana Public Infractions Report, supra note 258, at 1, 7.
271. Id. at 6 (describing Sampson’s conduct as “undermin[ing] [the] enforcement and infractions processes that depends on the cooperation, and rules compliance, of coaches.”).
272. See id.
273. The case also resulted in the COI concluding that Indiana failed to monitor its men’s basketball program. See Indiana Public Infractions Report, supra
note 258, at 6 (explaining that the COI, not the Enforcement Staff, made the
failure to monitor allegation). Indiana was shocked at the COI’s conclusion, and
then-Big Ten commissioner Jim Delany described the COI’s finding as imposing a
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and numerous recruiting restrictions.274 The COI imposed a five-year
show-cause order on Sampson.275
4.

Bruce Pearl

Tennessee hired Bruce Pearl as its head men’s basketball coach in
2005.276 Pearl and his program enjoyed immediate success, as Pearl
guided the Volunteers to twenty-one wins in his first season, which tied the
record for number of victories in a head coach’s first year at Tennessee.277
Tennessee rewarded Pearl by extending his contract by two years and increasing his average annual compensation to $1.3 million.278 Tennessee,
pleased with Pearl’s ongoing success, extended his contract and increased
his compensation again in both 2008 and 2009.279
However, Pearl and his staff violated NCAA recruiting rules a couple
years later when, among other incidents, Pearl hosted prospective studentathletes at his home when they were on campus for unofficial visits.280
Pearl compounded the matter by instructing the prospects and their family members to not disclose the gathering because it violated NCAA
rules.281 Pearl did not report the violation to Tennessee, denied knowledge of it when Tennessee officials asked him about it, encouraged others
to provide false information regarding the matter, and originally lied to
strict liability standard on universities who hire coaches with checkered backgrounds. See Clifton, supra note 259, at 78.
274. See Indiana Public Infractions Report, supra note 258, at 40–43.
275. See id. at 46. Many believe that a show-cause order serves as a scarlet
letter for college head coaches, or at least blacklists them from other college athletics employment. Lens, supra note 218, at 21. Sampson did not coach college
hoops again until his five-year show-cause order expired. See id. at 35.
276. See Epstein, supra note 134, at 21 (describing Pearl as “[n]o stranger to
controversy”).
277. See UT Sports Information, Vols Ink Pearl to New Contract, VOLQUEST (Mar.
8, 2006), http://tennessee.rivals.com/news/vols-ink-pearl-to-new-contract [https:/
/perma.cc/5C8W-WJ56] (describing Pearl’s contract extension based on his success on the court).
278. See id. (noting that athletics department resources, not state revenues,
funds Tennessee’s coaches’ salaries).
279. SECLiveNews.com, Bruce Pearl Signs New Contract with Tennessee, BLEACHER
REP. (Apr. 6, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/151863-bruce-pearl-signsnew-contract-with-tennessee?source=rss_teams_Tennessee_Volunteers [https://
perma.cc/2FE6-2VJW] (describing raises that increased Pearl’s annual salary to
over $2.3 million).
280. See NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 1 (Aug. 24, 2011), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102351 [https://perma.cc/3VSG-8Z6F] [hereinafter TENNESSEE PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS REPORT]. The interactions during these prospect-funded campus visits between Tennessee coaches and the prospective student-athletes at Pearl’s
home constituted impermissible off-campus contact under NCAA recruiting legislation. See id. at 3.
281. See id. at 4. In April 2009, the Enforcement Staff received an anonymous
letter containing a photograph of Pearl and one of the prospective student-athletes standing together at Pearl’s home. See id. at 1.
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the Enforcement Staff during interviews.282 In a subsequent interview,
Pearl provided truthful information to the Enforcement Staff.283
Upon receiving the Enforcement Staff’s Notice of Inquiry in September 2010, Tennessee self-imposed sanctions including reducing Pearl’s salary by $1.5 million over five years and prohibiting him from off-campus
recruiting for one year.284 However, Tennessee not only chose to retain
Pearl, it also publicly and enthusiastically gave him a vote of confidence.
Then-athletics director Mike Hamilton proclaimed, “Bruce made one mistake in this incident and he came forward to correct it. I’m glad he’s our
basketball coach.”285
After conducting additional interviews, the Enforcement Staff sent
Tennessee an NOA in February 2011.286 Tennessee took the interesting
step of terminating Pearl’s contract yet presenting him with a new one at
the reduced salary as punishment for his involvement in the NCAA violations.287 Hamilton admitted:
A lot of this is legal procedure . . . . Basically the information that
came to light in the course of the investigation warranted the
termination of his previous contract as it was written. There will
be some changes in terminology of the contract. The main thing
is the compensation will be changed.288
However, Pearl continued to work while not under contract.289 Yet
some have pointed to Pearl’s employment contract as the reason Tennes282. See id. at 1.
283. See id. at 7.
284. Andy Katz, Bruce Pearl Protected by Contract, ESPN (Sept. 17, 2010), http://
espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=5582439 [https://perma.cc/
5BV3-6QLV].
285. Id.
286. See TENNESSEE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 280, at 19–20.
287. Vols’ Bruce Pearl Working Without Deal, ESPN (Oct. 21, 2020), https://
www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=5712243 [https://
perma.cc/3GZ6-Z4MG].
288. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In a document it filed with the
NCAA, Tennessee claimed it did not terminate Pearl’s employment because doing
so may deter others from reporting misconduct. Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, Tennessee Officials Defend How Pearl Was Fired, LUBBOCK ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2011), http://
lubbockonline.com/article/20110726/SPORTS/307269899 [https://perma.cc/
335Q-92MY]. However, perhaps Pearl’s immense on-court success—Pearl had led
Tennessee to its first Elite Eight appearance in the men’s basketball tournament in
March 2010—was Tennessee’s impetus for retaining Pearl when it first learned of
the impermissible gathering at his home. See Katz, supra note 284 (describing
Pearl’s success). Hamilton publicly stated that Tennessee was prepared to stand
behind Pearl even if the NCAA suspended him for a season. See Tennessee Fires
Bruce Pearl, ESPN (Mar. 21, 2011), http://espn.com/mens-college-basketball/
news/story?id=6243862 [https://perma.cc/UJW6-ZEVF]
289. See Tennessee Fires Bruce Pearl, supra note 288 (stating Pearl worked without a contract after Tennessee terminated his employment contract).
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see did not terminate his employment.290 Pearl’s contract precluded Tennessee from terminating him for cause absent a COI “finding” that
determined Pearl knowingly engaged in or condoned conduct that constituted a “significant” NCAA violation.291 The attorney who represented
O’Brien in his lawsuit against OSU described Pearl’s employment contract
with Tennessee:
It’s hard to imagine a contract that affords a coach more protection than . . . Jim O’Brien’s contract with Ohio State . . . . Bruce
Pearl doesn’t have to imagine though, because he’s got just such
a contract.292
Tennessee likely would have had a strong argument that the circumstances justified termination with cause under Pearl’s employment contract once the NCAA infractions process ran its course. However, Pearl
never gave Tennessee that chance, making Tennessee pay—literally—for
continuing to employ him following the Notice of Inquiry and the NOA
and was no longer a Tennessee employee when the infractions process
concluded.
As stated earlier, when Tennessee self-imposed recruiting restrictions
following receipt of the Notice of Inquiry, it self-imposed recruiting restrictions, including prohibiting Pearl from recruiting off-campus for a
year.293 However, for whatever reason, Tennessee delayed the effective
date of the off-campus recruiting prohibition for two weeks.294 During
that two-week period, and just four days after Tennessee’s press conference revealing the NCAA investigation into its men’s basketball program,
Pearl committed another NCAA violation.295 When recruiting in Virginia,
Pearl engaged in an impermissible “bump” with a prospective student-athlete.296 Again, Pearl failed to self-report the violation to Tennessee admin290. See Katz, supra note 284 (citing interview of Columbus-based attorney Joseph Murray, who represented O’Brien in his lawsuit against OSU).
291. Id. (quoting relevant portion of Pearl’s contract); see also Epstein, supra
note 134, at 21.
292. Katz, supra note 284 (quoting Columbus-based attorney Joseph Murray).
293. See id.
294. See Will Shelton, Bruce Pearl Fired at Tennessee, SB NATION (Mar. 21, 2011,
2:30 PM), http://rockytoptalk.com/2011/3/21/2063725/bruce-pearl-fired-at-tennessee [https://perma.cc/6GN3-LKBD] (referring to Tennessee’s decision to delay the effective date of the off-campus recruiting ban as “ill-advised”); see also Mike
Rutherford, Why Some People Hate Bruce Pearl: A Timeline, SB NATION (Apr. 4, 2019),
http://sbnation.com/college-basketball/2019/4/4/18295241/bruce-pearl-finalfour-timeline-infractions-auburn-iowa-deon-thomas-wire-milwaukee-violations
[https://perma.cc/Z27K-XAB4] (describing Tennessee’s decision to not make the
punishments effective immediately as “a crucial error in judgment”).
295. See Shelton, supra note 294.
296. See id. During certain times of the year, NCAA rules permit coaches to
evaluate prospective student-athletes but not have contact with them. See Jeremy
Crabtree, Inside Spring Guidelines, ESPN (Mar. 1, 2015), http://espn.com/collegesports/recruiting/football/story/_id/12404435/the-recruiting-rules-rule-spring
[https://perma.cc/RG8X-3BWE] (explaining NCAA evaluation periods). During
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istration.297 After learning of the impermissible bump, then-Southeastern
Conference commissioner Mike Slive suspended Pearl for Tennessee’s
next eight SEC conference games.298 Tennessee terminated Pearl’s employment in March 2011.299 The parties agreed to a so-called buyout for
just under $950,000.300
Had Pearl remained a Tennessee employee through the course of
COI proceedings regarding the gathering at his home, Tennessee would
have had a strong argument to terminate his employment with cause. The
COI’s findings relevant to the determination of whether cause would have
existed under Pearl’s contract included:
• Pearl knowingly engaged in an NCAA violation as he admitted to the Enforcement Staff that he advised parents of one of
the prospective student-athletes that it would be an NCAA violation to attend a gathering at Pearl’s home.301
• Pearl lied to both Tennessee administrators and the Enforcement Staff when, among other things, he professed to be unthese periods of time in which the NCAA permits evaluations, but not contact,
coaches may not engage in lengthy dialogue with a prospective student-athlete
when they “bump” into them. Id. (stating sarcastically that “it’s amazing how
recruiters manage to bump into the one player they’re looking for at a high school
with hundreds of students and teachers”).
297. See id. (describing the impermissible bump as a likely secondary
violation).
298. Id.
299. See id. (noting that Tennessee’s chancellor overruled its athletics director’s desire to retain Pearl). The impermissible bump likely “tipped the scales
against Pearl.” Tennessee Fires Bruce Pearl, supra note 288.
300. See Bruce Pearl Out as Tennessee Coach, FOX SPORTS (Mar. 21, 2011), http:/
/foxsports.com/stories/college-basketball/bruce-pearl-out-as-tennessee-coach
[https://perma.cc/MSP9-UYKX] (noting Hamilton described both Pearl’s impermissible gathering at his home and impermissible bump as factors in the decision
to part ways with Pearl); see also Jason Kirk, Bruce Pearl’s Non-Contract Buyout Amount
Revealed In Tennessee AD Mike Hamilton’s Statement, SB NATION (Mar. 22, 2011),
http://atlanta.sbnation.com/georgia-bulldogs/2011/3/22/2064866/bruce-pearlfired-contract-buyout-tennessee-basketball [https://perma.cc/6WFN-PJEL]. Because Pearl was working without a contract, it is debatable whether Tennessee legally owed him any amount or whether it was a payment in exchange for Pearl
agreeing to not fight the NCAA allegations. See id; see also Tennessee Fires Bruce Pearl,
supra note 288. Pearl’s buyout amount was just a small fraction of the amount
Tennessee paid in buyouts to coaches and administrators in the ten-year period
from 2008 to 2018. During that time period, Tennessee saw the “termination or
resignation of two athletics directors, four football or basketball coaches and two
chancellors.” UT Buyouts Over Past 10 Years Top $24 Million, WBIR (May 2, 2018),
http://wbir.com/article/news/local/ut-buyouts-over-past-10-years-top-24-million/
51-548254549 [https://perma.cc/KYJ3-VRKU] Their buyouts totaled more than
$24 million. Id. (describing departures of individuals including Hamilton and
Jimmy Cheeks, Tennessee’s chancellor at the time Tennessee separated from
Pearl).
301. TENNESSEE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 280, at 4.
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familiar with the location depicted in the photo, despite that
it was his own kitchen.302
• Though he denied it, Pearl attempted to influence other individuals’ accounts for their Enforcement Staff interviews.303
• Pearl twice signed forms attesting that he had reported any
NCAA violations of which he was aware to Tennessee’s compliance staff.304
Thus, it appears Pearl knowingly committed NCAA violations. His extensive efforts to conceal them show that he believed the incident was not
insignificant. Of note is that the definition of a “major violation” at the
time Pearl engaged in the impermissible activities incorporates the term
“significant.” Per the 2008-2009 NCAA manual:
A secondary violation is a violation that is isolated or inadvertent
in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal
recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include
any significant recruiting inducement or extra benefit. Multiple
secondary violations by a member institution may collectively be
considered as a major violation.305
The month following Pearl’s departure from Tennessee, the COI issued a written report concluding that Pearl engaged in multiple major violations, including impermissible phone calls, impermissible recruiting
contact, unethical conduct, and failure to monitor and promote a compliant atmosphere.306 At the time, the NCAA defined major violations as
“[a]ll violations other than secondary violations are major violations, specifically including those that provide an extensive recruiting or competitive advantage.”307 Thus, by NCAA definition, Pearl’s violations were
“significant.” Applying the language of Pearl’s employment contract, the
Enforcement Staff and COI’s conclusions that Pearl knowingly committed
“significant” and “major” NCAA violations likely would have constituted a
circumstance justifying terminating Pearl’s employment with cause had
Tennessee still employed him under his contract. This could have saved
Tennessee the nearly $1 million it paid Pearl under the so-called buyout.
In sum, despite Tennessee officials supporting Pearl when Tennessee
publicly disclosed the violations stemming from the gathering at Pearl’s
home, the University parted ways with Pearl a couple weeks later after
302. Id. at 6 (noting Pearl also lied about whether he knew the identity of
another individual, an assistant coach’s wife, in the photo).
303. See id. at 6–7 (describing Pearl’s conversations with a prospective studentathlete’s father).
304. See id. at 5 (describing annual Certification of Compliance form).
305. NCAA, 2008-09 DIVISION I MANUAL § 19.02.2.1 (2008), http://ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D109.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7SN-QMN7]
[hereinafter 2008-09 MANUAL].
306. See TENNESSEE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 280, at 3–10, 14.
307. 2008-09 MANUAL, supra note 306, § 19.02.2.2.
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learning he committed the “bump” violation that, per NCAA definition,
was insignificant.308 Pearl left Tennessee with both a severance payment
of nearly $1 million and NCAA sanctions.309
5.

Rick Pitino

The aforementioned Pitino’s program presented the COI with a case
unlike any it had encountered.310 In 2017, the COI concluded, among
other things, that a Louisville “men’s basketball staff member arranged oncampus striptease dances and acts of prostitution for enrolled student-athletes and prospective student-athletes . . . some of whom were minors, on
their campus visits” over a three-and one-half-year period.311 The COI
characterized the staff member’s planning and facilitation of the actions as
Level I NCAA violations.312 The COI also concluded Pitino committed a
Level I violation of head coach responsibilities legislation by failing to
monitor the staff member.313 Thus, under Bylaw 11.1.1.1, Pitino was vicariously responsible for the staff member’s actions and violation.314 The
COI imposed penalties including placing Louisville on four years of probation, banning Louisville’s men’s basketball program from the postseason,
reducing available athletics scholarships in the men’s basketball program,
recruiting restrictions, suspending Pitino from coaching in five conference games in the 2017-18 season, and vacating wins and records during
the relevant time period.315 Louisville appealed some of the penalties, but
the Infractions Appeals Committee upheld them.316 As a result, Louisville
holds the dubious distinction as the first Division I men’s basketball program forced to vacate a national championship—it won the title in
308. See Shelton, supra note 294 (describing impermissible “bump” violation).
309. Sanctions included two years of probation and numerous recruiting restrictions. See TENNESSEE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 280, at 13–18.
Auburn University hired Pearl in 2014, where his tenure has included on-court
success like leading Auburn to the 2019 Final Four, and off-court troubles including Auburn’s involvement in the federal investigation into corruption in men’s
college basketball. See Rutherford, supra note 294.
310. LOUISVILLE PUBLIC INFRACTIONS DECISION, supra note 1, at 1.
311. Id. at 1, 4 (noting most of the illicit activity occurred in the Minardi Hall
dormitory, which Pitino raised money to build and name in honor of his brotherin-law, who died in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011).
312. See id. at 2 (finding the acts constituted recruiting and ethical conduct
violations).
313. See id. (noting the COI did not conclude Pitino knew of the violations
but determined he failed to exercise sufficient oversight of the staff member’s
operations).
314. See id. at 1, 18 (explaining that Pitino failed to rebut the presumption of
responsibility).
315. See id. at 22–26.
316. See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, DECISION OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE 7 (Feb. 20, 2018), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/
miCaseView/report?id=102666 [https://perma.cc/ARJ4-S3US].
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2013.317 Then-interim Louisville president Greg Postel disagreed with the
Appeals Committee’s decision regarding the staff member’s “offensive and
inexcusable” actions.318
Louisville elected to retain Pitino notwithstanding the COI’s findings
and punishments.319 Louisville did so despite having the ability to terminate Pitino’s employment under two separate clauses in Pitino’s contract.320 More specifically, Louisville could have argued that, by
permitting the men’s basketball program to use prostitutes and strippers
to entice prospective student-athletes, Pitino engaged in “willful misconduct that could objectively be anticipated to bring him into public disrepute or scandal.”321 And “to the extent [he] knew about the misconduct
and lied about [it],” Pitino engaged in acts of “moral depravity.”322
However, it was not the “shameless sexual escapades” that were the
subject of the COI case and penalties that served as the impetus for Louisville to oust Pitino.323 Rather, it was an FBI allegation only a couple
months later that Louisville agreed to pay a prospective student-athlete
$100,000 through Adidas to secure his enrollment that led to Pitino’s termination.324 One day after federal prosecutors released a series of criminal complaints involving corruption and bribery in men’s college
basketball that included the allegation involving Louisville, the University
317. See Gary B. Graves, Louisville Must Vacate Basketball Title, NCAA Denies Appeal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 20, 2018), http://apnews.com/article/ap-top-news-instate-wire-basketball-college-sports-sports-c2c67d13ef72450894095dc3369ee185
[permalink unavailable] (describing Louisville’s sex scandal as “embarrassing”).
For a discussion on whether the technical vacation of the 2013 national championship is actually impactful, see Andy Staples, Louisville Has Bigger Problems Than a
Meaningless Banner Removal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 20, 2018), http://si.com/
college/2018/02/20/louisville-loses-2013-ncaa-national-championship-penalty
[https://perma.cc/HYH7-C552].
318. Graves, supra note 317 (quoting Postel, who explained that Louisville
apologized immediately for the staff member’s actions and fully cooperated with
the NCAA during its investigation).
319. See Lindsay Schnell, Scandal Finally, Correctly, Finishes Rick Pitino at Louisville, But His Legacy Is Set, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2017), http://usatoday.com/story/
sports/ncaab/columnist/2017/09/27/rick-pitino-louisville-legacy-great-coach-toomany-scandals/709384001/ [https://perma.cc/73F2-ZWB4] (explaining that the
escort scandal was the second sex scandal Pitino survived at Louisville).
320. Grieb, supra note 5 (characterizing Louisville twice retaining Pitino after
separate sex scandals as placing “winning and revenue ahead of its decency”).
321. Id. (quoting contract language).
322. Id. (pointing out that the self-proclaimed madame who published a book
regarding the arrangement between escorts and the staff member claimed “Pitino
knew everything regarding the prostitution visits”). One media member found it
“comical” that Pitino repeatedly claimed he had no idea what happened in his own
program. Schnell, supra note 319.
323. See Grieb, supra note 5 (questioning Louisville’s decision-making process
and reasoning).
324. See id. (identifying the prospective student-athlete as Brian Bowen, whose
verbal commitment to attend Louisville was a shock when he announced it
publicly).
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placed Pitino on unpaid administrative leave.325 Pitino countered that, by
doing so, the board was “in material breach of the terms” of his contract.326 Louisville’s Athletic Association’s Board voted to begin the employment termination process for Pitino.327 In correspondence to Pitino,
Postel cited the escort scandal and Pitino’s failure to notify proper authorities when an agent who was a criminal defendant in the federal bribery
case was on campus among the reasons for terminating Pitino’s employment.328 Pitino’s attorney tried to convince the Board that it should not
terminate Pitino’s employment for cause.329 The Board was not swayed,
however, voting unanimously to terminate Pitino for “just cause” under his
contract.330 At the time, Pitino had several years remaining on his contract, during which time Louisville was to pay him $44 million.331 Legal
expert Michael McCann has stated:
From a plain reading of Pitino’s contract, it appears that the university is well within its authority to fire him for just cause. Even
when viewing Pitino in the most favorable light, he seemingly
failed to prevent various kinds of corruption that have damaged
the university’s name and brand. More critical interpretations of
Pitino’s behavior suggest he knew about the corruption or perhaps even directed some of it.
If any of those interpretations proves correct, Pitino would have
violated his contract in a way that likely empowers the university
to fire him for cause.332
Pitino sued Louisville in federal court for just under $39 million,
claiming it violated his employment contract by: (1) “plac[ing] him on
administrative leave without the required notice[;]” and (2) “fir[ing] him
without cause.”333 Pitino’s complaint stated Louisville provided eight reasons for terminating his contract, including “disparaging media publicity,”
“a major [university], [conference], or NCAA rule violation,” and “failing
325. See McCann, supra note 3.
326. Louisville Fires Rick Pitino Amid Federal Investigation, CBS BALT. (Oct. 16,
2017), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2017/10/16/louisville-pitino-fired/
[https://perma.cc/CU8F-DS7V].
327. Id.
328. See McCann, supra note 3, for a full list.
329. Pitino’s contract required Louisville to provide him notice and an opportunity to exonerate himself. See McCann, supra note 3.
330. See Louisville Fires Rick Pitino Amid Federal Investigation, supra note 326.
331. See id.
332. McCann, supra note 3.
333. Kevin Koeninger, Rick Pitino Sues University of Louisville Over Firing,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Dec. 1, 2017), http://courthousenews.com/rick-pitinosues-university-of-louisville-over-firing [https://perma.cc/8MP6-TZBK] (detailing
Pitino’s complaint against the University of Louisville Athletic Association). Pitino
contended he was entitled to annual payments of $4.3 million through 2026 per
the liquidated damages provision in his contract. See id.
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to promote an atmosphere of compliance, academic integrity, and ethical
conduct.”334 Pitino argued that the media publicity did not constitute
cause for his termination because coverage did not result from his “willful
misconduct.”335 He also argued that he promoted a compliant atmosphere and that his contract does not hold him “strictly liable for his assistant coaches’ alleged misdeeds.”336 The Hall of Fame coach’s complaint
denied his involvement in the Adidas scheme, contended that Louisville
failed to conduct an independent investigation, and claimed that Louisville locked him out of his office, restricted his e-mail account, and effectually fired him by placing him on administrative leave.337
Pitino and Louisville filed cross motions for summary judgment
largely addressing Louisville’s ability to rely on the escort scandal in its
decision to terminate Pitino with cause. Louisville’s motion argued that
the University encountered three of the most “notorious scandals in college sports history during Pitino’s tenure,” referencing Pitino’s marital affair, the escort scandal, and the federal investigation.338 More specifically,
Louisville described Pitino’s failings as “devastating” for the University,
and contended that the NCAA violations resulting from the escort scandal
provided just cause under Pitino’s employment contract.339 Pitino’s motion contended “that the escort scandal [was] irrelevant” to the just cause
determination “because the conduct occurred prior to the parties execution of” Pitino’s most recent and applicable employment contract.340 In
oral arguments, Pitino’s attorneys pointed out that Louisville initially defended Pitino regarding the escort scandal but later, after the federal in-

334. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
336. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
337. Id. (quoting Pitino’s complaint as stating he “had no part—active, passive, or through willful ignorance—in the conspiracy described in the complaint”).
338. See Gentry Estes, University of Louisville: Damage Caused by Rick Pitino ‘Catastrophic,’ COURIER J. (May 16, 2018), http://courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2018/05/15/ulaa-rick-pitino-catastrophic-damage-universitylouisville/610378002/ [https://perma.cc/GMD7-FT8G] (quoting Louiville’s motion). Pitino’s marital affair does not directly implicate NCAA rules and, though
salacious, is relatively irrelevant to this Article. However, the affair and fallout
from it likely constituted a just cause circumstance for terminating Pitino under his
contract had Louisville chosen to exercise it. See Adam Epstein, Kentucky and Sports
Law, 30 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 117, 131–32 (2019).
339. See Estes, supra note 338.
340. Augustus Flottman, Rick Pitino’s Lawsuit Against Louisville Could Set New
Precedent on Contract Law, FARUKI (May 22, 2019), http://ficlaw.com/blog/business-litigation/archives/rick-pitinos-lawsuit-against-louisville-could-set-new-precedent-on-contract-law [https://perma.cc/862Y-3LCP] (describing Pitino’s
argument that conduct that occurred during the operation of a prior contract cannot support a breach of contract claim after the parties supersede or substitute
their prior agreement with a new contract as “a nuanced question of contract
law”).
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vestigation implicated Louisville, attempted to use both scandals to justify
terminating his employment with cause.341
Ultimately, Pitino and Louisville settled Pitino’s lawsuit. As part of
the settlement agreement, Louisville described Pitino’s departure as a resignation but he did not receive any money.342 Iona University would later
hire Pitino as its head men’s basketball coach, while Louisville received an
NOA from the Enforcement Staff related to its involvement in the Adidas
scandal.343
6.

Kevin Ollie

Kevin Ollie’s basketball career enjoyed “a meteoric rise”, beginning as
a student-athlete in the University of Connecticut (UConn) men’s basketball program from 1991 to 1995 and continuing throughout a thirteenyear NBA career, during which “[h]e became a respected clubhouse mentor to young superstars like LeBron James and Kevin Durant.”344 His success continued when he became UConn’s head coach in 2012 and led the
team to a national championship in 2014.345 Ollie’s fall from one of the
hottest coaching commodities in basketball “was just as swift and
stunning.”346
After finishing the 2017-2018 season with a 14-18 record and losing in
the first round of its conference tournament, UConn terminated Ollie’s
341. See Danielle Lerner, Lawyers for U of L and Pitino Clash in Court Over Contract Payout and Escort Scandal, COURIER J. (Apr. 25, 2019, 7:10 PM), http://courierjournal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2019/04/25/rick-pitino-louisvillelawyers-fight-over-contract-escort-scandal/3572573002/ [https://perma.cc/TKY9MJGE] (quoting Pitino’s attorney arguing, “Why are we talking about Katina Powell when for three years they said he did nothing wrong? . . . . It was always about
this Adidas thing and it didn’t materialize like they thought it would” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
342. See Danielle Lerner, Rick Pitino Reaches Settlement With University of Louisville Athletic Association, COURIER J. (Sept. 18, 2019, 8:53 AM), http://courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2019/09/18/rick-pitino-universitylouisville-athletics-association-reach-settlement/2354450001/ [https://perma.cc/
9RPC-Q3QZ] (“Pitino said he agreed to the settlement against his attorney’s
advice.”).
343. See Paul Zeise, Why Does the NCAA Always Punish Schools But Rarely
Coaches?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 6, 2020), http://pressherald.com/2020/
05/06/why-does-the-ncaa-always-punish-schools-but-rarely-coaches/ [https://
perma.cc/669T-48HV] (describing Pitino’s history of “funny interpretation of the
rules” and lack of attention in following them, including providing prospective
student-athletes with coupons for free McDonald’s food while an assistant coach at
the University of Hawaii).
344. Dom Amore, Kevin Ollie Fired After UConn Claims ‘Just Cause’; Coach Says
He Will Fight, HARTFORD COURANT (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.courant.com/
sports/uconn-mens-basketball/hc-sp-uconn-ollie-fired-20180310-story.html
[permalink unavailable].
345. See id. (noting Ollie’s success led to rumors that NBA organizations perennially considered him for head coaching positions).
346. Id. (noting Ollie’s UConn record was 97-44 through four seasons, followed by 30-35 over the next two seasons).
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employment with cause, meaning it would not have to pay him $10 million
for the multiple years remaining on his contract.347 The “just cause”
stemmed from a then-pending NCAA inquiry into the program’s impermissible offseason activities that included individuals from outside the program.348 The NCAA’s then-ongoing investigation also examined whether
UConn’s men’s basketball program committed NCAA recruiting violations.349 Ollie immediately released a statement that he intended to contest that UConn possessed just cause to terminate his employment.350
Ollie’s employment contract language regarding the circumstances
constituting “just cause” was broad.351 The contract effectively stated that
if UConn or the NCAA concluded Ollie violated NCAA rules, Ollie would
be subject to suspension without pay.352 Further, Ollie would be subject
to termination with cause in the event of significant or repetitive violations.353 Thus, notably, Ollie’s contract did not require a complete NCAA
investigation, let alone finding, before UConn could act.354 Moreover,
UConn could terminate Ollie’s employment with cause if the NCAA cited
one of Ollie’s assistant coaches for NCAA violations.355

347. See id.
348. See id. (describing the NCAA’s restrictions on summer workouts at the
time as “strict”).
349. McCann, supra note 146 (providing example of UConn alum and NBA
legend Ray Allen making a phone call to a prospective student-athlete in violation
of NCAA rules).
350. See Amore, supra note 344 (quoting Ollie’s statement, in which Ollie
states he “always diligently promoted an atmosphere of compliance”). UConn
thought it was done with Ollie, but Ollie was “by no means done with the University of Connecticut.” Michael McCann, How Kevin Ollie Could Contest UCONN’s ‘Just
Cause’ Firing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 19, 2018), http://si.com/college/2018/
03/19/uconn-mens-basketball-coach-kevin-ollie-fired-just-cause-legal-analysis
[https://perma.cc/4KST-8W6P]. Ollie went through UConn’s appeals process,
and UConn’s president upheld the just cause termination, concluding Ollie partook in multiple transgressions that violated his contract. UConn President Alleges
Ollie Broke NCAA Rules, TIMES UNION (June 25, 2018), http://timesunion.com/
sports/article/UConn-president-alleges-Ollie-broke-NCAA-rules-13025629.php
[https://perma.cc/6HGT-8227] (quoting the president explaining that “a series
of ‘isolated’ or ‘de minimis’ violations can become a pattern of noncompliance”
(emphasis added)).
351. See Amore, supra note 345 (citing interview with Pepperdine University
sports law professor Alicia Jessop).
352. See McCann, supra note 350.
353. See id. (describing implications of UConn having the ability to terminate
Ollie’s employment with cause as he was the highest paid state employee at the
time and to continue to have to pay him would invite valid criticism regarding
spending priorities and use of taxpayer money).
354. See Amore, supra note 344 (quoting Jessop as explaining, “[UConn] can
arguably get out of the contract well before the NCAA ever concludes its
investigation”).
355. See id. (citing interview with Jessop).
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The ensuing dispute between Ollie and UConn reads like a law student’s nightmare civil procedure exam fact pattern:356
• In Connecticut, public university employees may unionize,
and UConn’s teaching and research staff unionized and negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).357 Ollie’s
employment contract stated that he was entitled to the same
personnel benefits that union members receive.358 Ollie won
a battle when an arbitrator ruled that the CBA between Ollie,
UConn’s chapter of the American Association of University
Professors, and UConn took precedence over Ollie’s employment agreement.359 That CBA contained language requiring
a higher standard for just cause termination.360 The COVID19 pandemic delayed the arbitration, as did the arbitrator’s
death.361
• Along the way, Ollie threatened to sue UConn for defamation
and false light after UConn released 1,355 pages of documents related to its decision to terminate Ollie’s employment
with cause.362 Ollie and his attorneys contended that UConn
designed the release of the documents to disparage Ollie’s
character and inhibit his ability to obtain future
employment.363
• Ollie filed a federal lawsuit against UConn alleging it illegally
attempted to stop him from filing a “racial discrimination
356. Ollie’s dispute with UConn “has been a complicated web of lawsuits and
charges and has often been nasty, despite Ollie’s long association with UConn, as a
student-athlete, assistant coach and head coach, a role in which he led UConn to
the national championship in 2014.” Dom Amore, Resolution in Kevin Ollie’s Contract Dispute with UConn Will Be Further Delayed by Death of Arbitrator Marcia Greenbaum, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.courant.com/sports/
uconn-mens-basketball/hc-sp-uconn-men-kevin-ollie-ncaa-arbitration-marciagreenbaum-20210126-20210125-6budcrf5ifepbpbunrjioxdxku-story.html [https://
perma.cc/H7GQ-DWK7].
357. See McCann, supra note 350 (explaining that Ollie, though not a professor, falls within the bargaining unit because his employment contract so dictates).
358. See id. (quoting Ollie’s employment contract).
359. David Borges, Kevin Ollie Wins Ruling on Union Protection in Fight Over Firing, CT POST (Aug. 13, 2019), http://ctpost.com/uconn/article/Kevin-Ollie-winsruling-on-union-protection-in-14301861.php [https://perma.cc/3XQ5-GKTD].
360. Id. (explaining that UConn believed the employment agreement governed the dispute).
361. See Jackson Lewis, The University of Connecticut Loses Termination Arbitration
with Former Coach, JD SUPRA (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
university-of-connecticut-loses-3268960/ [https://perma.cc/CU8F-DS7V].
362. See McCann, supra note 146.
363. Id. (noting documents included a transcript of an interview of one of
Ollie’s former assistant coaches that indicated Ollie paid a prospective studentathlete $30,000 to attend UConn in violation of NCAA rules).
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claim stemming from his employment termination.”364 Ollie
claimed UConn subjected him to “disparate treatment,” noting the NCAA violations for which UConn terminated his employment were less significant than violations that occurred
under his predecessor Jim Calhoun’s watch.365 Ollie’s suit
sought emergency injunctive relief that would have permitted
him to proceed with his discrimination claim while continuing the arbitration process with UConn.366 The court dismissed Ollie’s claim, concluding it was not ripe.367 Ollie’s
attorney insisted that Ollie was “playing a long game” and
would pursue the race discrimination claim following arbitration with UConn.368
• Ollie filed a lawsuit against Glenn Miller, once Ollie’s top assistant coach, alleging that Miller slandered Ollie in remarks
during an NCAA Enforcement interview about Ollie paying a
prospective student-athlete’s mother to induce the prospective student-athlete to attend UConn.369 Miller’s attorney described the lawsuit as an effort to intimidate Miller.370
• Ollie’s legal team subpoenaed Ollie’s successor, Dan Hurley,
to testify in Ollie’s arbitration hearing.371
In July 2019, the COI released its written decision regarding NCAA
violations in UConn’s men’s basketball program. The COI concluded that
364. Joel Anderson, Kevin Ollie Cites Jim Calhoun and Racial Discrimination as
Part of Suit Against UConn, ESPN (Dec. 18, 2018), http://espn.com/mens-collegebasketball/story/_/id/25567958/former-coach-kevin-ollie-files-suit-uconn-huskies
[https://perma.cc/CBS4-T6BD] (describing suit filed in U.S. District Court in
Hartford, Connecticut).
365. See id. (noting Calhoun won three national championships at UConn).
366. See id. (noting Ollie had a deadline by which to pursue a complaint with
the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities).
367. See David Borges, Kevin Ollie Dealt a Loss by Federal Judge in Racial Discrimination Claim, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:04 PM), http://nhregister.com/uconn/article/Kevin-Ollie-dealt-a-loss-by-federal-judge-in13590843.php [https://perma.cc/UGR6-NTMH] (stating it was a loss for Ollie,
even though he was not coaching at the time).
368. Id.
369. Associated Press, Ex-UConn Basketball Coach Kevin Ollie Sues Former Assistant, USA TODAY (Apr. 30, 2019, 2:01 PM), http://usatoday.com/story/sports/
ncaab/2019/04/30/former-uconn-coach-kevin-ollie-sues-former-assistant/
39423293/ [https://perma.cc/FJ59-H37N] (noting the NCAA did not allege any
violations against Ollie or UConn over the alleged payment).
370. Id. (internal wuotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller’s lawyer Drzislav
Coric).
371. See Michael Shapiro, Dan Hurley Subpoenad by Kevin Ollie in UConn Arbitration Hearing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 23, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/
2020/02/23/dan-hurley-subpoenaed-kevin-ollie-uconn-arbitration-case [https://
perma.cc/HY99-9CWL] (describing Ollie’s basis for the subpoena as “[t]he timing
of [Hurley’s] hiring is obviously relevant to when the decision was made to fire
Kevin Ollie” (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
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violations in the areas of “benefits, practice, coaching personnel, and
recruiting” occurred.372 Further, Ollie “violated ethical conduct and head
coach responsibility legislation and failed to cooperate” with the investigation.373 In fact, the COI pointedly stated that Ollie’s failure to maintain
control both increased the severity of his violations and allowed them to
occur within the program for most of his tenure.374 The COI issued penalties including placing UConn on probation for two years, fining UConn,
reducing the number of available athletics scholarships in UConn’s men’s
basketball program, and numerous recruiting restrictions.375 The COI
also placed a three-year show-cause order on Ollie.376 As part of the showcause penalty, Ollie would serve a suspension of thirty percent of the first
season of employment should any NCAA member university employ him
between July 2, 2019 and July 1, 2022.377 Ollie appealed several of the
findings and the show-cause penalty to the Infractions Appeals Committee.378 The Appeals Committee affirmed the COI’s findings and penalty.379 Regardless, an arbitrator ruled in January 2022 that UConn
improperly terminated Ollie’s employment and ordered the University to
pay him over $11 million.380 UConn disagreed with the arbitrator’s ruling
that the University should have waited until the infractions process concluded before determining it possessed cause to terminate Ollie’s
employment.381
372. NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT PUBDECISION 1 (July 2, 2019), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/miCaseView/report?id=102778 [ https://perma.cc/SK4R-LTAG].
373. Id.
374. See id. (stating that “[t]he case illustrate[d] the importance of full candor
and cooperation in the infractions process, as well as head coach control. The
head coach faltered in both respects, increasing the severity of his violations and
allowing violations within the program to occur for most of his tenure”).
375. See id. at 28.
376. See id. at 28–29 (explaining that the show-cause order was due to Ollie
knowingly providing false or misleading information during the investigation, failure to cooperate with the investigation, and declining to participate in a second
interview with the Enforcement Staff after UConn terminated his employment).
377. See id. at 29. Ollie recently accepted a coaching and player development
position with “Overtime Elite, a new professional basketball league for top prospects between 16 and 18 years old.” Adrian Wojnarowski, Ex-UConn Coach Kevin
Ollie to Coach New Elite Basketball Prospect Venture, ESPN (Apr. 12, 2021), http://
espn.com/espn/story/_/id/31242042/sources-ex-uconn-coach-kevin-ollie-coachnew-elite-prospect-venture [https://perma.cc/VMN6-W97Z].
378. See NCAA DIV. I COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, DECISION OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I INFRACTIONS APPEALS COMMITTEE,
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT 1 (May 6, 2020), http://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/
miCaseView/report?id=102853 [https://perma.cc/M4GS-ZNGB].
379. See id.
380. See Associated Press, Former UConn Men’s Basketball Coach Kevin Ollie Wins
Arbitration Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2022), http://si.com/college/2022/
01/20/arbitrator-makes-ruling-on-uconns-dismissal-of-kevin-ollie [https://
perma.cc/BX5E-UZVK].
381. See id. (describing the University’s response to the arbitrator’s ruling).
LIC INFRACTIONS
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Takeaways and Recommendations Stemming from Recent Instances Where
Universities Made Employment Decisions Regarding Head Coaches
Involved with NCAA Rules Violations

University administrators can learn lessons from each other’s coach
employment contract drafting mistakes. Among them is that they should
not shy away from over inclusiveness and specificity when identifying circumstances that justify termination with cause. For example, OSU learned
its lesson after its situation involving O’Brien, increasing the number of
circumstances justifying termination with cause from three in O’Brien’s
employment contract to fifteen in successor Thad Matta’s employment
contract.382 Indiana benefited from having the foresight of including
more specific termination for cause language addressing Sampson’s prior
conduct at Oklahoma when he repeated that conduct, providing Indiana
justification to terminate his employment with cause.383
While the foregoing paragraph encourages universities to specify circumstances justifying termination with cause, inclusion of vague and subjective language that provides universities flexibility can be beneficial. For
example, including subjective language like “moral turpitude” in addition
to the more specific list of circumstances can be advantageous for universities seeking to part ways with a coach.384 Further, universities should be
careful that their head coach employment contracts do not limit them to
the specific instances enumerated as justification for termination with
cause. Thus, when listing the circumstances, universities should include
language prior to the list indicating that the list is not all-inclusive (e.g.,
“such as” and “including”).385
Despite these learning opportunities that situations like O’Brien’s
provide, many universities continue to have to pay rule-breaking coaches
millions of dollars to not work for them. Universities usually attempt to
mitigate the likelihood of having to do so contractually. Again, virtually
every college head coach employment contract requires the coach to
abide by and comply with NCAA rules.386 Further, most head coach employment contracts include language that a deliberate or serious violation
of an NCAA bylaw that reflects adversely on the university or an athletics
382. See Greenberg, supra note 83, at 218–21 (quoting Matta’s employment
contract, comparing it to O’Brien’s, and concluding “OSU clearly was doing everything possible to avoid another problem like the O’Brien situation”).
383. See id. at 214–15 (explaining that Sampson’s situation at Oklahoma led
Indiana to attempt to protect itself from repercussions of Sampson’s violations at
Oklahoma).
384. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 152.
385. For example, see the relevant language in paragraph 4 of Sampson’s employment contract with Indiana on page 45.
386. See Greenberg & Gruber, supra note 45, at 194–95 (providing example
contract language from coaches’ contracts including former Texas Tech University
head football coach Kliff Kingsbury). The inclusion of university, conference, and
NCAA rules is an “important aspect” of coaches’ contracts. Stangel, supra note 38,
at 153.
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program, or that results in the NCAA placing the university on probation,
constitutes a just cause basis for termination.387 Importantly, a violation
finding by the COI, as opposed to the university, is usually a prerequisite
for just cause.388 For example, California State University, Northridge
head men’s basketball coach Mark Gottfried’s employment contract permitted the University to terminate him with cause upon an NCAA finding
of Gottfried’s involvement in the men’s basketball scandal.389
However, due to its nature, the NCAA’s infractions process can complicate or interfere with universities’ ability to render their desired employment decisions when their employment contracts obligate them to
wait on the process concluding with a violation finding to justify termination for cause. Perhaps the biggest complication for universities is how
long it takes a case to traverse the infractions process. The NCAA and COI
have received so much criticism about the infractions process’s sluggishness that the NCAA’s enforcement website includes an entire page entitled, “Why can infractions cases take a long time to investigate?”390 Data
from the NCAA’s 2019-20 Division I Infractions Annual Report indicates
that the average infractions case starts with the Enforcement Staff investigating between twelve and twenty months.391 If the Enforcement Staff’s
investigation substantiates allegations, it alleges potential Level I or Level
II violations in an NOA.392 In a contested case, the university (and other
involved individuals) have ninety days to file a written response addressing
the allegations.393 The Enforcement Staff has the opportunity to file a
written reply to the university’s written response.394 The COI hearing will
occur no sooner than thirty days after the Enforcement Staff’s written reply.395 A case spends an average of seven days to four months with the
COI.396 A university or involved individual can appeal a COI finding or
387. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 147 (noting that the contract also likely
references conference or university rules, which are less relevant to this Article)
388. Stangel, supra note 38, at 153–54.
389. See Schrotenboer et al., supra note 54 (describing the contract provision
as protection for the university).
390. Why Can Infractions Cases Take a Long Time to Investigate?, NCAA, http://
ncaa.org/enforcement/why-can-infractions-cases-take-long-time-investigate
[https://perma.cc/XVN8-JW3T] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
391. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at
6–7 (explaining that the Enforcement Staff’s investigation duration depends on
the case type).
392. See id. at 9.
393. See 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 19.7.2.
394. See id. § 19.7.3.
395. See BRYNNA BARNHART, AYAZ HAFEEZ, RUSSELL REGISTER & TODD SHUMAKER, NCAA REGIONAL RULES PRESENTATION: WHAT THE ENF? AN INTERACTIVE
JOURNEY THROUGH THE FOUR STAGES OF A LEVEL I/II INFRACTIONS CASE 33, http://
ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/compliance/rrs/2021/presentations/aw/AssociationWide_Enforcement—What_The_ENF.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD4H-5US2] (last
visited Jul. 7, 2021) [hereinafter REGIONAL RULES PRESENTATION].
396. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at
6–7 (explaining that the length of time depends on the case type).
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penalty.397 An appealing university or individual has fifteen days after the
COI releases its decision to notify the Infractions Appeals Committee of its
intent to appeal.398 The university or individual then has thirty days in
which to file an initial written submission supporting the appeal.399 The
appeals committee advocate then has thirty days to file a written response.400 The university or individual may file a written rebuttal with the
appeals committee.401 And, finally, the Enforcement Staff has ten days
thereafter to provide a written statement to the appeals committee.402 After the written submissions and oral argument, the infractions appeals
committee spends an average of four months deciding a case.403 “Any
appealed penalty is stayed and does not apply through the appeal process.”404 Thus, it is conceivable, if not likely, an NCAA violations case can
take over a year from the time the Enforcement Staff begins its investigation to the time the COI releases its decision. In 2020, for example, the
COI decided a case that took two and a half years to resolve.405 An appeal
would extend the timeline even further.
Given the length of time it takes the COI to process cases, universities
can put themselves in a no-win situation when their head coach employment contracts require COI adjudication prior to being able to terminate
employment with cause. In this scenario, when a university has reason to
believe its head coach was involved in NCAA violations and wants to terminate the coach’s employment, its two choices are to do so without cause or
for cause. In the former situation, the university likely will have to pay a
large percentage of the amount remaining on the coach’s contract or negotiate a buyout. If the university wishes to save money by terminating the
coach’s employment with cause, it may have to retain the coach for several
months or even years while the infractions process plays out if COI adjudication of the violation is a termination with cause prerequisite. This can
result in an unhappy, awkward partnership and affect recruiting and team
morale.
1.

An Illustration: The University of Arizona and Sean Miller

Consider what happened with Miller and Arizona. Perhaps no university was more embroiled in the men’s basketball corruption scandal since
federal authorities announced their bombshell investigation in September
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See id. at 7 (illustrating infractions process).
See 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 19.10.2.
See id. § 19.10.3.
See id. § 19.10.3.2.
See id. § 19.10.3.3.
See id. § 19.10.3.4.
See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 7.
Id.
See REGIONAL RULES PRESENTATION, supra note 396, at 35.
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2017.406 At that time, federal authorities arrested one of Miller’s now-former assistant coaches, Book Richardson, on federal fraud and bribery
charges.407 In February 2018, ESPN reported Miller paid $100,000 to secure a prospective student-athlete’s enrollment.408 As a result, Miller did
not coach in one game and did not work for four more days while Arizona
officials asked him “directed and pointed questions” about the allegations.409 Arizona apparently heard what it needed—or wanted—to hear,
because it announced in March 2018 that Miller would remain as head
coach.410
Miller’s employment contract permitted Arizona to terminate his employment with cause for circumstances including “demonstrated dishonesty” and “a material or repetitive violations” of NCAA rules.411 One legal
expert explained at the time that proof or a COI finding that Miller paid
the prospective student-athlete would have provided Arizona a defensible
rationale for terminating Miller’s employment with cause.412 However,
the infractions process is still ongoing as of this writing. Thus, if Arizona
had wanted to separate from Miller amid the negative publicity, it would
have had to terminate his employment without cause. In that scenario,
Arizona would have owed Miller more than $10 million under his
contract.413
Instead of terminating Miller, Arizona and Miller amended their employment agreement in April 2018 to reflect what would happen if the
COI determined Miller committed a Level I violation.414 In that event,
Miller would lose $1 million of his $4.1 million longevity bonus if Arizona
406. See Matthew Bain, Why Sean Miller and Arizona Basketball Will Survive the
Recruiting Fallout from NCAA, AZ CENT. (Jul. 22, 2019), http://azcentral.com/
story/sports/college/ua/2019/07/22/sean-miller-arizona-basketball-college-basketball-recruiting-fbi-ncaa-drew-askew-nimari-burnett/1795780001/ [https://
perma.cc/TP7P-V2MJ] (noting the irony that few other men’s basketball programs
had enjoyed as much recruiting success in the timeframe since the scandal).
407. See Bruce Pascoe, Sean Miller’s Revised Contract Terms Include Threat of a
Fine, New Title IX Obligations, TUCSON.COM (Apr. 15, 2018), http://tucson.com/
sports/arizonawildcats/basketball/sean-millers-revised-contract-terms-includethreat-of-a-fine-new-title-ix-obligations/article_2dee0bde-5b01-57bc-ad94dcf3d5a761a0.html [https://perma.cc/DR52-2YWZ].
408. See id.
409. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. See id. (noting Miller coached the final six games of the 2017-18 season).
411. Michael McCann, What’s Next for Sean Miller and Arizona? Why His Contract Language Could Play a Pivotal Role, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2018), http:/
/si.com/college/2018/02/25/arizona-sean-miller-contract-ncaa-scandal [https://
perma.cc/Z8LF-TXNQ] (describing Miller’s termination for cause provision as
“customary”).
412. See id. (analyzing Miller’s employment contract’s for cause termination
provision).
413. See Steve Berkowitz, If Arizona Fires Sean Miller For Cause, It Would Set Up
Potential Legal Fight Over Contract, USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 2018), http://
usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/pac12/2018/02/24/arizona-fires-sean-millercause-legal-fight-possible/370554002/ [https://perma.cc/X6RP-3QP8].
414. See Pascoe, supra note 407.
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retained him despite the COI finding.415 Alternatively, Miller would lose
his longevity fund shares if the University terminated his employment with
cause.416
Miller and Arizona continued to receive negative publicity for the
scandal when a March 2020 HBO documentary entitled The Scheme
aired.417 In the documentary, individuals accused Miller of paying prospective student-athletes to enroll at Arizona in violation of NCAA
rules.418
In October 2020, Arizona received the Enforcement Staff’s NOA that
alleged nine violations, including numerous Level I allegations against
men’s basketball staff members.419 Among them was a Level I charge
against Miller for violating NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation.420 Arizona’s infractions case will go through the Independent Accountability Resolution Process (IARP).421 The IARP was created in 2018
in order for a panel of individuals completely independent of the NCAA
and its members to adjudicate complex cases involving alleged violations
of core NCAA values.422 The case should resolve in 2022.423
Despite the serious allegations, Arizona permitted Miller to continue
to coach, and Arizona won seventeen out of twenty-six games in the 202021 season.424 Due to Arizona’s proactive self-imposition of a postseason
415. See id. (explaining that “Miller became fully vested in 175,000 shares of
Western Refining Logistics stock on May 31, 2017”).
416. See id.
417. See Adam Zagoria, New HBO Film Reveals Unheard Audio Between Former
Runner Christian Dawkins and Sean Miller, Will Wade, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2020), https:/
/www.forbes.com/sites/adamzagoria/2020/03/18/new-hbo-film-reveals-neverbefore-heard-audio-recordings-between-former-runner-christian-dawkins-andcoaches-sean-miller-will-wade/?sh=547831e44746 [https://perma.cc/AQ7LRFPQ].
418. See id. (quoting Dawkins and his attorney).
419. See Bruce Pascoe, Still Awaiting Word From IARP, Arizona President Robert
Robbins Says ‘Sean Miller Is Our Coach’, ARIZ. DAILY (Jun. 22, 2021), http://tucson.com/sports/arizonawildcats/still-awaiting-word-from-iarp-arizona-presidentrobert-robbins-says-sean-miller-is-our-coach/article_435e6f9c-8035-11eb-9707f35bf59fa1c7.html [https://perma.cc/5X8F-M75F] (describing other violation allegations against men’s basketball staff members including that they falsified academic records for prospective student-athletes, accepted $20,000 in bribes, and
loaned $500 to a student-athlete and attempted to cover it up).
420. See id.
421. See id. (noting there were already four cases on the IARP docket ahead of
the Arizona case at the time).
422. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 5,
34, 37.
423. See Bruce Pascoe, NCAA Says IARP Cases Involving Arizona, Five Other
Schools to Be Finished Within a Year, ARIZ. DAILY (Apr. 28, 2021), http://tucson.com/
sports/arizonawildcats/basketball/pascoe/ncaa-says-iarp-cases-involving-arizonafive-other-schools-to-be-finished-within-a-year/article_a71367b6-a84b-11eb-8bc4773f71e99ddb.html [https://perma.cc/5ASK-AQP2].
424. See Dan Wolken, Opinion: Time for Arizona to Make a Decision on Sean
Miller’s Future, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2021), http://usatoday.com/story/sports/col-
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ban when media reports implicated Arizona and Miller in the scandal, its
men’s basketball season concluded at the end of the regular season.425
Following the scandal, a lack of postseason success became the norm
under Miller for Arizona’s storied program. After the scandal became
public in 2017, Arizona did not win another NCAA men’s basketball tournament game until 2022, and overall, only won around half of its games
between 2017 and 2021.426
The Arizona-Miller relationship became increasingly awkward after
the 2021 season. Shortly after the 2021 season, amid questions about
Miller’s future with Arizona, its president Robert Robbins stated at a press
conference that Miller “is our coach.”427 Robbins explained that Arizona
would wait for an adjudication from the IARP before making a determination on Miller’s future.428 However, at the time, there was no timetable
for the IARP to adjudicate the matter.429
While Arizona officials publicly supported Miller, they had not evidenced their support tangibly by extending his contract. Miller was under
contract through June 30, 2022.430 Because of the impact it could have on
recruiting, it is almost inconceivable for a university to permit its employment contract with a head coach to reach its final year.431 Miller had
been at Arizona for twelve years and received contract extensions in 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017.432 With Miller’s contract only having a year
left on it, making him a “lame duck” coach, one national writer described
Arizona as “paralyzed by dysfunction and indecision” and explained that
Miller’s tenure at Arizona reached “a boiling point.”433 Perhaps Arizona
lege/columnist/dan-wolken/2021/03/10/ncaa-investigation-sean-millers-futurearizona-crossroads/6937349002/ [https://perma.cc/EP7M-KPRR] (describing
Miller’s work as “an impressive coaching job”).
425. See id.
426. See Jeremy Cluff, Sean Miller Contract Status Looms Over Arizona Wildcats
Basketball Program, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 24, 2021), http://azcentral.com/story/
sports/college/ua/2021/02/24/arizona-basketball-sean-miller-contract-statuslooms-over-wildcats/6804903002/ [https://perma.cc/GZH9-77K5] (quoting San
Jose Mercury News commentator Jon Wilner as describing Arizona as not very good).
427. See Pascoe, supra note 407.
428. See id. (quoting Robbins as stating, “They could have new findings. We
just have to wait and find out what the final word is going to be.”).
429. See id.
430. See Brian J. Pedersen, Arizona Head Coach Sean Miller Not Thinking About
Contract Extension Yet, SB NATION (Feb. 23, 2021), http://azdesertswarm.com/basketball/2021/2/23/22288993/sean-miller-contract-extension-arizona-wildcats-final-year-future-ncaa-investigation-postseason-ban [https://perma.cc/2DS6-3FX5]
(noting that Miller’s employment contract stated Arizona would pay him $2.9 million for the 2021-22 term).
431. See id. (explaining that, at the time, Arizona lacked any verbal commitments from class of 2022 prospective student-athletes, likely because there was no
assurance Miller would still be on the job).
432. See id.
433. Wolken, supra note 424 (explaining that the IARP was “moving at a glacial pace” and it could take another year for it to resolve the case).
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had grown cold on Miller because of his recent relative lack of on-court
success and the shine had worn off the amazing success in the early part of
his tenure.434
A month after Robbins publicly supported Miller, Arizona terminated
Miller’s employment.435 Arizona fired Miller without cause, and thus
owed him roughly $1.5 million under his contract.436 Arizona had already
paid Miller over ten million dollars in salary and retention bonuses since
the federal investigation into men’s college basketball became public.437
Arizona’s handling of Miller’s employment status and how much it paid
him both to coach and go away since the scandal became public is especially noteworthy given the recent financial struggles of its athletics department. Just a few months before terminating Miller and paying him $1.5
million to go away, Arizona’s athletics department eliminated twenty-one
full-time positions and elected to not fill fifteen vacant positions.438 However, Arizona may have felt it lacked cause to terminate Miller under his
contract since the IARP had not adjudicated the NCAA violations
allegations.

434. See id. (noting that Miller had been to three Elite Eights and two Sweet
Sixteens in his first eight seasons).
435. See Ryman & Cluff, supra note 24 (quoting athletics director Dave Heeke
as stating it was time for a “fresh start”).
436. See id. (explaining that Miller’s contract permitted “him to receive 50%
of his remaining guaranteed pay”). One national sports commentator criticized
Arizona’s handling of the situation, stating that Arizona terminated Miller’s employment due to his recent lack of on-court success but had been willing to look
past the NCAA violations allegations, thus evidencing where its “ethical compass”
lies. See Pete Thamel, Sean Miller’s Firing Proves the Only Unacceptable Thing in College
Basketball is Losing, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 7, 2021), http://sports.yahoo.com/seanmiller-firing-college-basketball-losing-ncaa-case-235343119.html [https://perma.
cc/XG5N-458D].
437. See Thamel, supra note 436 (wondering why Arizona did not terminate
Miller’s employment with cause). Xavier University (Xavier) hired Miller as its
head coach in March 2022. See Dennis Dodd, With NCAA Enforcement on Its Last
Legs, Congress Seeks to Place Limits on Investigations, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 29, 2022, 4:55
PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/with-ncaa-enforcement-on-its-last-legs-congress-seeks-to-place-limits-on-investigations/ [https://
perma.cc/8UVJ-8QBC]. Perhaps ironically, Greg Christopher serves as Xavier’s
athletics director and hired Miller. Id. Christopher served on the COI from 2012
to 2020. Id. In fact, Christopher chaired the COI when the enforcement staff
accused Miler of NCAA violations at Arizona. Id.
438. See University of Arizona Athletic Department Cutting 21 Jobs in Wake of Financial Crisis, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Nov. 2, 2020), http://azcentral.com/story/sports/college/ua/2020/11/02/arizona-athletic-department-cutting-jobs-due-financialcrisis/6133011002/ [https://perma.cc/YQT6-GMFN] (noting that the athletics
department expected to lose $45 million or more due to the COVID-19
pandemic).
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2.

A Potential Solution: Employment Contract Language That Requires an
NOA—Instead of COI or IARP Adjudication—of NCAA Violations
Allegations for Cause to Exist

This Article suggests that, when drafting the list of circumstances that
provide it with the ability to terminate a coach’s employment with cause in
the employment contract, universities should specify that an NOA alleging
a Level I or II violation against a head coach—as opposed to the industry
standard of a COI or IARP finding—is sufficient to constitute cause.439
Doing so would protect universities and increase their flexibility when
faced with a situation where the Enforcement Staff alleges violations
against a coach.440 It can—and does—often take a year or more for the
IARP, COI, or infractions appeals committee to adjudicate an Enforcement Staff’s allegations. When employment contracts require such an adjudication, this often leaves universities employing, paying millions of
dollars to, and enduring an awkward relationship with, rule breaking
coaches.
While at first glance this may seem undesirable for coaches, the reality
is that the COI is extremely likely to affirm any Enforcement Staff allegation.441 Per NCAA data it released in 2019, the COI affirms ninety-three
439. Universities would likely prefer employment contract language akin to
that in Sampson’s contract with Indiana or Ollie’s contract with UConn. A university would perhaps attain maximum protection and flexibility when its head coach
employment contract provides that termination for cause exists upon the university unilaterally determining that the head coach committed a Level I or II violation that would reflect adversely on the university. Such language perhaps could
have given Arizona cause to terminate Miller’s employment as early as 2017 after
federal authorities implicated Arizona and Miller in the college men’s basketball
scandal, for example. Note, however, that the allegations and innuendo surrounding Miller and potential illicit activities ultimately was not part of the Enforcement
Staff’s NOA. See Wolken, supra note 424 (citing rumored payments to former Arizona men’s basketball student-athlete Deandre Ayton as an example). However,
given former assistant coach Book Richardson’s involvement in, and arrest stemming from, the scandal, combined with allegations regarding academic fraud, it is
likely that Arizona could have determined that Miller committed a Level I or II
violation of NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation. Note, however, that because the NCAA was investigating Sampson for rules violations at Oklahoma when
Indiana hired him, the circumstances of his hiring were unique. UConn and
Ollie are engaged in multiple disputes regarding his termination. Further,
coaches would not want their universities to have that much autonomy in determining whether a situation constituted a Level I or II violation and thus determining their fate. Therefore, coaches and their agents would likely be loath to agree
to such one-sided language.
440. The employment contract should also specify that the university’s receipt
of an NOA alleging a Level I or II violation against the head coach constitutes a
material breach of the contract. This would proactively counter O’Brien’s successful argument in his dispute with OSU that one incident of wrongdoing did not
amount to a material breach given his history as a coach.
441. Universities’ head coach employment contracts should also specify that
cause exists when the Enforcement Staff alleges a Level I or II head coach responsibilities violation against the head coach for a staff member’s violation. Recall
that under NCAA Bylaw 11.1.1.1, head coaches are presumed responsible for the
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percent of the Enforcement Staff’s allegations.442 Thus, head coaches
would not assume much more, if any, risk by agreeing to this language. If
a head coach balked at this proposed language during employment contract negotiations, the university could counter by offering some small
amount of severance if the university terminated the coach’s employment
with cause under the provision. Even if a university had to pay some severance, it would still enable it to exit the relationship in a less expensive
manner than through termination without cause.
If done correctly, the suggested language would increase clarity of
what constitutes cause under the contract, thus mitigating the likelihood
the parties end up in litigation regarding whether cause existed.443 This is
increasingly important. While universities and head coaches typically “settle [their splits] in the backroom rather than the courtroom,” the O’Brien
and Neuheisel cases emboldened coaches like Ollie to pursue disputes
with universities.444 Aggrieved coaches, who believe their universities
lacked cause when terminating them, are increasingly likely to air dirty
laundry in a courtroom and use the public forum as leverage against their
former employers.445 For example, within days of Washington State terminating Rolovich’s employment for cause, his attorney announced plans for
legal action, describing the termination as “unjust and unlawful” and
describing the athletics director’s behavior as “discriminatory and
vindictive.”446
actions of their staff members. 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 11.1.1.1. It may
seem harsh to permit termination a head coach for cause for a staff member’s
violation. However, the COI has only ruled against an Enforcement Staff Bylaw
11.1.1.1 allegation twice in the dozens of times the Enforcement Staff has brought
it as of this writing. See Lens, supra note 174. In other words, a head coach has
successfully rebutted the presumption of responsibility for a staff member’s actions
only twice. Thus, universities should feel empowered to pursue and insist on the
inclusion of the ability to terminate a head coach’s employment with cause for
allegations that a staff member committed a Level I or II violation.
442. JON DUNCAN, ENFORCEMENT SELF-STUDY OPERATIONS AND COMPLIANCE 7,
http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/infractions/guides/
2019ENF_SelfStudyOperComp.pdf [https://perma.cc/AG9J-RELB] (last visited
July 9, 2021) (contending that this data shows that the Enforcement Staff makes
well-supported charges).
443. One legal scholar describes termination clauses as the most difficult to
negotiate in the employment contract. See Greenberg, supra note 44, at 209. However, it has become increasingly important to draft and negotiate employment
agreements with specific provisions that detail the circumstances that qualify as
termination for cause. See Dennie, supra note 82.
444. Greenberg, supra note 83, at 230.
445. Id. (citing the Neuheisel case as a good example). University presidents/chancellors and administrators likely recognize the short attention span of
their athletics programs’ fans and try to make the negative attention disappear by
buying out coaches’ employment contracts. See Elliott et al., supra note 202 (citing
example of Iowa State University’s handling of the departure of head men’s basketball coach Larry Eustachy)
446. Pete Thamel, Former Washington State Football Coach Nick Rolovich’s Attorney
Plans to Take Legal Action Against School, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 20, 2021), http://
sports.yahoo.com/former-washington-state-football-coach-nick-rolovichs-attorney-
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If Arizona’s employment contract with Miller had included the suggested language, it could have terminated him with cause in October
2020. Instead, he and Arizona played out the 2020-21 season with Miller
as a “lame duck” coach during which time prospective student-athletes
would not commit to attending the university because of Miller’s contract
status.447 The Arizona-Miller example illustrates a primary benefit of the
suggested language—it could provide universities flexibility when faced
with an employment decision regarding coaches formally accused of
NCAA rules violations. After all, the COI or IARP is extremely likely to
formally deem them NCAA rules violators after passage of (significant)
time.
It appears that LSU may have recently attempted to include similar language in its contract with Wade. LSU indefinitely suspended Wade in
March 2019 after he refused to answer its questions about the leaked FBI
wiretaps that included Wade telling Dawkins he made a “strong-ass offer”
to a third party close to a prospective student-athlete to influence the prospect to attend LSU.448 Wade based his refusal to meet with LSU and
NCAA officials on his criminal attorney’s advice.449 However, after Wade
hired the attorney who also represented Miller and Pearl, Wade reversed
course and agreed to meet with LSU and the NCAA.450
Because Wade breached his contract by initially declining to cooperate with LSU’s investigation, LSU and Wade amended their employment
agreement.451 The amendments included adding two circumstances that
would justify termination for cause:
plans-to-take-legal-action-against-school-141857174.html [https://perma.cc/QS7JR68L] (describing Rolovich’s stance as based on his Catholic faith).
447. Note that Arizona had the opportunity to include this language when it
amended Miller’s contract in 2018 but instead required an adjudication of the
violations.
448. See Bryn Stole, LSU Coach Will Wade Gave Up Bonuses, Made Contract Concessions Amid Reinstatement, ADVOCATE (Apr. 24, 2019), http://theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_204cdb80-66d6-11e9-b8df-ebea6e1c30b8.html
[https://perma.cc/PV9D-S9RB] (explaining that Wade gave up compensation bonuses that the team earned for him during his suspension).
449. See Glenn Guilbeau, Maybe LSU’s Wade is Not Done—Suspended Coach Hires
New Lawyer With Experience vs. NCAA, DAILY ADVERTISER (Apr. 5, 2019), http://
theadvertiser.com/story/sports/college/lsu/2019/04/04/lsus-wade-makes-movehires-attorney-ncaa-background/3368806002/ [https://perma.cc/WJ9J-V9QL]
(quoting Wade’s criminal attorney as explaining that Wade would meet with LSU
and NCAA officials following the then-pending criminal investigation).
450. See id. Thompson likely advised Wade that refusal to meet with LSU and
NCAA officials permitted LSU to terminate Wade’s contract with cause, in which
case Wade would forfeit $10 million in salary remaining on his contract. See Glenn
Guilbeau, Wow! Why the Sudden Change of Heart for LSU Coach Will Wade? Could it Be
the $10 Million?, DAILY ADVERTISER (Apr. 15, 2019), http://theadvertiser.com/
story/sports/college/lsu/2019/04/15/lsu-coach-wade-had-10-million-reasons-sitlsu-and-ncaa/3479853002/ [https://perma.cc/MM9M-GN2Q].
451. Steve Berkowitz, LSU Basketball Coach Will Wade Loses More Than $400,000
in Bonuses, Pay After Investigation, USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2019), http://
usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/sec/2019/04/24/lsu-basketball-coach-will-
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xviii. If the NCAA Committee on Infractions, subject to any and
all appeals before the NCAA Infractions Appeals Committee, ultimately finds COACH to have committed any Level 1 or Level 2
violation, as defined by NCAA regulations, before April ___,
2019, LSU shall have cause to terminate COACH’s employment,
whether such claims are pursuant to the Employment Agreement
or otherwise. In that event, COACH hereby agrees to waive any
and all claims that LSU wrongfully terminated him or terminated
him without cause, whether such claim is based on the Employment Agreement or otherwise.
xix. If the NCAA Committee on Infractions issues a formal notice of allegations of a Level 1 or Level 2 violation to LSU involving COACH, LSU shall have cause to terminate COACH’S
employment, whether such claims are pursuant to the Agreement or otherwise. In that event, COACH hereby agrees to waive
any and all claims that LSU wrongfully terminated him or terminated him without cause, whether such claim is based on the Employment Agreement or otherwise.452
It is unclear whether section xviii required a COI adjudication before
April 2019 or whether it was an attempt to refer to the NCAA’s definition
of Level I and II violations on that date. Either interpretation of the contract language is reasonable. However, the latter possibility is likelier because the amendments were discussed and implemented in April 2019 and
the Enforcement Staff had not even issued an NOA at that point so clearly
there could be no COI adjudication by April 2019. However, speaking of
NOAs, section xix permits termination for cause upon the COI issuing an
NOA that included a Level I or II violation involving Wade. However, the
Enforcement Staff, not the COI, issues NOAs.453 The COI does have the
ability to conclude that a coach committed a violation even when the Enforcement Staff did not allege it, however.454 Further, LSU’s case is in the
IARP and therefore the NCAA’s Complex Case Unit issued the notice of allewade-loses-over-400-k-bonuses-pay/3567368002/ [https://perma.cc/M3MBQG8P] (noting Wade forfeited as much as $250,000 in bonus compensation as
part of the amendment). NCAA rules require employment agreements to include
a stipulation that athletics department staff members owe an “affirmative obligation to cooperate fully in the infractions process, including the investigation and
adjudication of the case.” 2020-21 MANUAL, supra note 155, § 11.2.1.
452. FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 2 (April 14, 2019), http:/
/bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/theadvocate.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/9/08/908aa4c8-66da-11e9-8ced-53355c45b939/
5cc0d9a8621a2.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3SU-BYUV].
453. See DIVISION I INFRACTIONS 2019-20 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 158, at 9.
454. See NCAA DIV. I COMMITTEE ON INFRACTIONS, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 5–12 (July 21, 2021) http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/d1/
infraction/D1COI_IOPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAS8-K7UM].
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gations instead of either the Enforcement Staff or COI.455 While it is
likely that LSU intended its contract amendment to give it cause to terminate Wade’s employment upon the Enforcement Staff or Complex Case
Unit issuing an NOA involving Wade, it is unclear from the amendment as
the parties drafted it. Thus, it is unclear as of this writing whether LSU
actually possessed cause under the contract amendment to terminate
Wade’s employment when it did so.
CONCLUSION
The NCAA infractions case pipeline is “clogged[,]” the process of investigating infractions can be “painstaking” for universities, and the wheels
of NCAA justice sometimes turn as if “mired in mud.”456 Southeastern
Conference commissioner Greg Sankey, likely referencing cases involving
universities implicated in the men’s basketball scandal, recently publicly
criticized the “unacceptable” timeline for “numerous high-profile infractions matters . . . .”457 Delayed justice in NCAA infractions matters has
likely enabled several potentially guilty parties to remain in their positions,
posing an image problem for the embattled NCAA that Sankey worries
could result in a “crisis of confidence.”458
Because of the way universities and their head coaches have drafted
their employment contracts, universities often must choose between two
undesirable choices when a coach commits a significant NCAA violation.
Under the typical contract, the university must choose whether to terminate the coach’s employment without cause and pay the coach a sizable
severance amount or terminate the coach without cause after the lengthy
infractions process concludes. A simple drafting change permitting universities to terminate head coaches with cause upon NCAA allegations of
significant rules violations would permit universities to part ways with their
head coaches sooner. For universities and athletics departments, the additional flexibility, potential cost savings, and ability to move on from a rulebreaking coach and avoid awkward, prolonged tenures is increasingly important in ever-evolving college athletics.

455. See Just & Alexander, supra note 18.
456. Tim Sullivan, Justice Delayed Is Justice NCAA-Style: Wheels Turning Slowly in
Solving DI Infractions, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Dec. 15, 2020, 5:46 PM), http://
www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2020/12/15/ncaa-infractions-cases-slow-way-organization-operates/6542680002/ [https://perma.cc/
79CX-J5GE] (noting “the reckoning remains irritatingly incomplete” despite that
over three years passed since federal officials confirmed extensive corruption in
men’s college basketball).
457. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sankey correspondence
to NCAA leadership).
458. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wade, Miller, and Self as
examples).
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